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Problem Description
Increasing connectivity and complexity of software make security more important than ever.
Despite this, security is often an afterthought governed by an ad hoc penetrate and patch
paradigm. Security is rarely taken into account throughout the entire software development
lifecycle. There are however methods and security knowledge available that can help developers
build more secure software. The increase in reported software vulnerabilities shows that these
are not being utilised efficiently. Security modelling is a method that can help software developers
prevent security problems at an early stage of development through identification of threats,
vulnerabilities and countermeasures. Security patterns are known solutions to recurrent security
problems.
The student is to explore how security modelling can be used to utilise expert security knowledge
such as security patterns to include security throughout the development lifecycle.
Assignment given: 15. January 2008
Supervisor: Torbjørn Skramstad, IDI

Abstract
Software security is an increasingly important part of software development as the risk
from attackers is constantly evolving through increased exposure, threats and economic
impact of security breaches. Emerging security literature describes expert knowledge
such as secure development best practices. This knowledge is often not applied by
software developers because they lack security awareness, security training and secure
development methods and tools. Existing methods and tools require too much effort and
security is often given less priority in the trade-off between functionality and security.
This thesis defines a tool supported approach to secure software analysis and design.
Possible vulnerabilities and their causes are identified through analysis of software spec-
ifications and designs, resulting in vulnerability cause graphs. The security modelling
tool SeaMonster is extended to include security activity graphs; this technique is used
with vulnerability cause graphs to model vulnerabilities and security improvement ac-
tivities. A security activity graph is created to identify activities that keep the vulner-
abilities from instantiating in the final software product. The activities in the security
activity graph can be the use of security patterns. This way the above approach is used
to find a security pattern as a countermeasure to a vulnerability, and can be used with
the security pattern design templates implemented in a preliminary project (13). This
is a way of providing coupling between security expertise and software developers to
apply security knowledge in software development practice. The approach and tools
are tested and demonstrated through a development case study of a medical patient
journal system.
The main contributions of this thesis are an approach to secure software analysis and
design, an extension of the security modelling tool SeaMonster, a case study of the
approach and tools that show how security can be incorporated in early stages of
software development. The contributions are intended to improve availability of security
knowledge, to increase security awareness and bridge the gap between software experts
and software developers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Security has become relevant for all parties involved with software development due to
increased risk from malicious users and the fact that software systems are continuously
growing in size, complexity and connectivity (46). The increase of Web applications
contribute to increased exposure to attacks and software vulnerabilities are likely to be
exploited. Developing secure applications is a complex process and requires an in-depth
understanding of potential security risks. Security modelling is a process of identifying
threats, which may give the required understanding to design or identify vulnerability
countermeasures. Security patterns are widely accepted security solutions that are
fitted to a general representation, allowing the solution to be used in many different
instantiations. The increase in cataloged vulnerabilities reported by CERT statistics 1
and security pattern publications show that there is clearly a need for better software
security methods and tools.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Software security has received a lot of interest over the last several years. The field
of computer security has experienced a change of focus from reactive network-based
security approaches to the idea of engineering software to function correctly under
malicious attack (46). Common design flaws and implementation bugs are leaving
1Carnegie Mellom University’s Software Engineering Institute’s CERT Coordination Center,
http://www.cert.org/stats/fullstats.html
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critical software systems open to attacks. The ad-hoc afterthought paradigm of security
is not sufficient. To improve the security of software systems, security must be built
in from the ground up. Most software developers are not trained in software security,
and security experts do not necessarily know much about development (46). There is
a need to bridge this gap, by giving developers and security experts proper tools and
methods. Security vulnerabilities and risks need to be mitigated by countermeasures.
Security patterns are among the countermeasures as a way of reusing expert security
knowledge in software designs and implementations. The process of finding the right
pattern is however not trivial and requires a thorough understanding of threats and
exposures to software systems. A study performed by the author (13) suggests that
security pattern support in software design tools might help developers design more
secure software. Security pattern design templates were implemented in a state-of-the-
art software design tool and tested through a case study of a medical journal system. It
is pointed out that there is a need for methods and tools to support the software security
modelling process to be able to identify suited security patterns and countermeasures
in general.
There is a need for methods and tools that give developers assurance with respect to
acceptable security risk levels. What vulnerabilities are prevented and to what degree?
Security modelling tools are practically non-existent. SeaMonster (61) is an open source
security modelling tool designed for all parties involved in secure software development.
SeaMonster was initiated by NTNU/SINTEF and currently supports threat modelling
with attack trees, misuse case diagrams and vulnerability cause graphs. SeaMonster is
a prototype which with further development could become an in-depth security mod-
elling tool. Sharing of modelling results between security experts and developers may
increase security awareness and enable security work in the entire software develop-
ment process. Information about known software vulnerabilities can already be found
in several publicly available repositories or databases, such as National Vulnerability
Database (60) or SecurityFocus (74). They provide information on vulnerabilities re-
garding system administration, and are therefore not very useful at development time.
Allowing a security modelling tool to share models with development tools, i.e. de-
sign tools, by the use of repositories is expected to bridge the gap between security
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professionals and developers, and most importantly help developers create more secure
software.
1.2 Problem Statement
The overall goal of this thesis is to explore and suggest how software security can be
improved by including security throughout the development lifecycle. Emphasis will be
put on the early stages of software development, i.e. analysis and design phases, and
on using security design patterns. A preliminary study is performed to survey current
practice in the field of software security. The work will develop an approach to software
security analysis and design and implement security improvement tools to support this
approach.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This thesis is organised in the following chapters:
2 Software Security Practices
This chapter describes state-of-the-art software security practices. This is done by de-
scribing trends in software that increase the importance of secure development and
currently documented security practices. Risk management, touchpoints and counter-
measures, and knowledge management are described as pillars of software security.
3 Security Modelling
This chapter describes security modelling practice; approaches to analysing security
issues in software. The described modelling techniques are threat modeling, attack
trees, abuse cases, vulnerability cause graphs and security activity graphs.
4 Countermeasures
This chapter describes security patterns and risk analysis as countermeasures to security
attacks.
5 Sharing Security Knowledge
This chapter describes technologies and methods for sharing of security knowledge. Ex-
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amples of vulnerability repositories are given and research on sharing security knowledge
that is applicable during development is described.
6 Research Agenda
This chapter describes the research design of the thesis. This includes research hypoth-
esis, objectives, method and work plan.
7 Using a Countermeasure Model During Development
This chapter describes an approach to improve secure software development practice
based on security modelling and countermeasures in design. A countermeasure model
is introduced as a formal representation of a vulnerability countermeasure.
8 Extending SeaMonster
This chapter describes the current status and possibilities for further development of
the prototype security modelling tool SeaMonster.
9 Realisation
This chapter describes the realisation of a security modelling tool. SeaMonster is used
as a baseline.
10 Case Study
This chapter is a case study of the approach in Chapter 7 and the implemented tool de-
scribed in Chapter 9. The case study works as a test and evaluation of the contributions
in the thesis.
11 Evaluation and Discussion
This chapter evaluates the contributions and discusses other initiatives in security im-
provement tools and methods.
12 Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis. The contributions are summarised and possibilities
for further work are presented.
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Chapter 2
Software Security Practices
Software security is receiving increased interest among researchers and practicioners.
The increased interest is a result of increase in reported security-related software vul-
nerabilities and incidents of security breach (48) as shown in Figure 2.1 1. This chapter
describes current activities in the discipline of software security. The need for change in
computer security practice is described by three important trends in modern software;
connectivity, extensibility and complexity. Risk management, security touchpoints and
knowledge management are described as the three pillars of software security. Any
organisation developing software can implement these pillars to build a cost-effective
software security program.
2.1 Introduction to Software Security
Software security is about engineering software to function correctly under malicious
attack. Reducing the risk of security breaches by reducing consequences of attacks, i.e.
isolating information from its users, might not be feasible in today’s software where
availability of information is key. The practice of software security tries to reduce
exposure to threats by reducing vulnerabilities to an acceptable level. The integration of
system and security engineering, leading to software security, is still in its infancy. Some
of the first books on software security practice were published in 2001 (5; 86). Progress
1Carnegie Mellom University’s Software Engineering Institute’s CERT Coordination Center,
http://www.cert.org/stats/fullstats.html
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Figure 2.1: Reported Software Vulnerabilities - Security-related vulnerabilities
reported to CERT/CC over several years
is however being made; big companies like Microsoft are recognizing software security
as an important part of software engineering by developing the Security Development
Lifecycle (53) and threat modelling techniques (80).
Computer system security is not a new field of computer science. Over three decades
ago, the Multics operating system was designed as a secure system by the use of design
principles such as access control lists and identification and authentication of users (68).
Computer security has often been regarded as a branch of communication security which
is based on cryptographic techniques and network theory (42). This view has produced
several reactive network-based security approaches, such as firewalls, intrusion detection
and cryptographic protocols (1). The term reactive in this setting means the approaches
are added during system deployment or production; they are not designed as part of the
software. Why is this no longer sufficient to produce secure computer systems? Three
trends in computing systems have a large influence on the growing security issues (48):
Connectivity: The Internet has increased the connectivity of computing systems. A
few decades ago, software systems were internal to organisations, limiting the number
of users to employees and potentially customers of the organisation. Most of today’s
software is however exposed to the Internet through a Web browser, introducing billions
10
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of potentially malicious users. The exposure to threats is increased dramatically which
increases the probability that software vulnerabilities will be exploited.
Extensibility: Systems have to a larger degree become extensible. Extensible systems
evolve in an incremental fashion by accepting updates or extensions, sometimes referred
to as mobile code (50). Examples are Web browser plug-ins that allow viewing of
different document formats. Word processors, spreadsheets, e-mail clients are extensible
through scripts, applets and plug-in components. Extensible software is attractive
because it may increase market share through rapid deployment. Extensible systems
are however prone to create software vulnerabilities as unwanted extensions.
Complexity: Modern software systems are growing in size and complexity. Defect
rate tends to increase with code size (32). This holds for security vulnerabilities as well
(46). Analysing, developing and proving that a software system is free of problems, is
probably not feasible at some point of complexity.
Along with the above trends, security is often a trade-off versus features and time to
market. For users and system administrators, security interferes with usability and ef-
fectiveness. Different groups involved with software think of security in different terms.
Software developers might think of code quality while administrators think of system
management and network-based security approaches. With the trends of modern com-
puting systems that make security harder to achieve, there is a need for methods and
tools to deal with security at a higher level. All phases of the software development
lifecycle should be included to build security in from the ground-up. Studies performed
on e-business applications show that 70% of identified security defects are design related
(37). Computer security must deal with software vulnerabilities.
Software security problems can be classified with some basic terminology. McGraw (46)
proposes the following categorisation:
Defect: Defects include both implementation vulnerabilities and design vulnerabili-
ties. A defect is a problem that may pass unnoticed or possibly surface in a fielded
system and impose major consequences.
11
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Bug: A bug is an implementation-level software problem. Bugs are fairly simple
implementation errors that can easily be discovered and fixed. The use of automated
tools to detect bugs is quite common and is a security best practice (45).
Flaw: Flaws are introduced at a higher level than bugs. A flaw will be instantiated
in code, but is usually introduced at the architecture or design level. Automated tools
to detect flaws do not yet exist.
Practice shows that at least 50% of software security problems are flaws (37; 46). This
shows that security is about more than coding issues, fixing code-level bugs will only
solve half the problem at best.
2.2 Pillars of Software Security
McGraw (46) defines applied risk management, software security touchpoints (best-
practices applied to software artefacts) and knowledge as the three pillars of software
security. The pillars can be applied by any organisation involved with developing
software to any software development methodology. A cost-effective security program
can be built by applying the pillars in a gradual manner. The pillars are described in
the following sections.
2.2.1 Risk Management
A risk management strategy seeks to find a cost-effective way to practical security.
There is no perfect defense in software simply because it would be too expensive (42). A
cost-effective risk management strategy balances the cost of applying a security program
and the risk of loss when software is compromised by attackers. Risk management is a
business-level decision support tool with an underlying goal; avoiding potential software
flaws before they materialise into vulnerabilities. The cost of software flaws tend to
increase as they are discovered later in the development lifecycle (47).
A complete risk management framework is composed of architectural risk analysis and a
management strategy. Applying risk analysis at the architectural level is a best-practice
and one of the to be mentioned touchpoints in Section 2.2.2. In security communities
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it is often referred to as threat analysis, security design analysis or security modelling,
the latter is described in Chapter 3. A risk management strategy tracks and mitigates
risk through the whole software development lifecycle (SDL).
McGraw (46) defines a Risk Management Framework (RMF) as the heart of building
secure software systems. The RMF identifies and tracks risk through a software de-
velopment project as touchpoints are applied and the risk landscape is changing. The
notion of risk management is not characteristic for software security alone, most fi-
nancial firms have a formal risk management department (28). Risk is defined by the
following relationship:
R = PxI
The probability (P) is the likelihood that a risk will materialise and become a problem.
The impact (I) is a metric for the business consequence of the problem. Quantification
of risk is essential in any risk management process.
The RMF defined by McGraw consists of five stages:
1. Understand the business context. Risk is tied to an organisation’s business
goals. Understanding these goals is important in order to be able to make deci-
sions and do prioritisation. If a risk does not impact the goals of the organisation,
it is not worth analysing.
2. Identify Business and Technical Risk. Technical risks are grounded in soft-
ware artefacts and are identified by the use of touchpoints. A technical risk should
be mapped to business goals through business risk such as financial loss, loss of
reputation etc. This process identifies what software flaws might potentially harm
the business.
3. Rank the Risks. This stage creates an output list of weighted risks that can
be used as a priority scheme. Risks are ranked according to their probability and
impact.
4. Define the Risk Mitigation Strategy. Security analysts are good at finding
technical problems, but not at finding the correct solutions. This is apparent
by the use of checklists of what not to do instead of describing what should
13
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be done (46). A risk analysis is worthless without a good mitigation strategy.
This strategy defines a cost-effective set of activities described by metrics such as
implementation cost and time or probability of success. The mitigation strategy
should also include validation techniques that are used to assure that mitigation
is successful. The validation techniques employ financial metrics such as return
on investment and risk coverage.
5. Mitigate and Validate. The last stage executes the mitigation strategy of phase
4. Software artefacts are validated to assure that they do not bear unacceptable
risk.
1 Understand the Business Context
2 Identify the Business and Technical Risks
3 Rank the Risks
4 Define the Risk Mitigation Strategy
5 Mitigate and Validate
Figure 2.2: Risk Management Framework - Five stages make up the looped RMF
process
The stages above should be applied in a continuous loop, as shown by Figure 2.2. There
are risks connected to all stages of software development, and so the output of the five
stages of the RMF should be kept updated. For example the RMF can be executed
once for every stage of the SDL.
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2.2.2 Security Touchpoints and Countermeasures
Software security is more than traditional security software features like cryptographic
protection of communications. Security is a system-wide property; it requires a combi-
nation of security features and design for security. This is one of the reasons security
has to be built in. Software developers have adopted security best practices to build
more secure software systems (45). Some of these practices are referred to as software
security touchpoints. These touchpoints apply a best practice to software artefacts
during development and are independent of the applied software development process.
McGraw et al. (85) defines seven touchpoints that includes common software devel-
opment artefacts; requirements and use cases, architecture, design, testing, code, test
results and deployment. The touchpoints are: Code Review, Architectural Risk Analy-
sis, Risk-Based Testing, Penetration Testing, Abuse Cases, Security Requirements and
Security Operations. The touchpoints are described briefly in the following paragraphs:
Code Review
Artefact: Code
Code is reviewed for implementation bugs. Static analysis tools are often applied to
discover common vulnerabilities (17). Higher level problems, i.e. architectural, are
hard to discover during code review, and requires architectural risk analysis.
Architectural Risk Analysis
Artefact: Design and specification
Security analysts search designs for flaws in software architecture. Possible attacks
against the system, weaknesses and ambiguity in specifications are identified. The
identified risks are then handled by a risk management process.
Penetration Testing
Artefact: System in target environment
Architectural risk analysis should give input to a penetration test of fielded software
in its target environment. Penetration testing uncovers environment and configuration
problems which can be fixed late in the development cycle. It is the most commonly
applied software security best practice (9).
Risk-Based Security Testing
Artefact: Units and System
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Security testing should include two strategies: 1) testing of security functionality by
functional testing and 2) risk-based security testing. The latter should be based on
attack patterns, risk analysis and abuse cases. To combine the knowledge of software
architecture and common attacks, it is essential to think like an attacker when per-
forming the tests.
Abuse Cases
Artefact: Requirements and use cases
Use cases describe the system’s behaviour and interaction with legitimate users. Ex-
panding the use case model with abuse cases describes how the system reacts to an
attack by malicious users. Applying abuse cases allow focus to be put on security in
early stages of software development. Abuse cases are further described in Section 3.2.3.
Security Requirements
Artefact: Requirements
Security must be grounded in software requirements and specify system functions in all
possible circumstances of use, legitimate or malicious (51). The security requirements
should cover both security functionality, such as access control, and non-functional
characteristics relevant to security.
Security Operations
Artefact: Fielded system
Secure design can not replace the need for security operations such as network security.
Attacks happen regardless of secure design and implementation. Security operations
in the fielded system allow feedback of knowledge on attacks and exploits, logging
procedures is a good example. This knowledge should be cycled back into the software
development process.
Figure 2.3 shows where the touchpoints are applied. Although the figure resembles a
traditional waterfall model, iterative approaches are very common today which means
the touchpoints could be applied several times during a development project.
Applying the touchpoints is a way of putting software security into practice by changing
the way organisations develop software. In order to reach a state of security, there
need to be some protection or prevention of vulnerabilities. A general term for the
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Code Review
Requirements and 
Use Cases
Feedback from the 
field
Tests and Test 
ResultsCodeTest Plans
Architecture and 
Design
Risk-Based 
Security TestsRisk Analysis
Abuse Cases
Sequrity 
Requirements
Risk Analysis
Penetration Testing
Security 
Operations
Figure 2.3: Touchpoints and Software Artefacts - The touchpoints are mapped to
their related software development artefacts
protection and prevention is a countermeasure. Touchpoints are countermeasures to
software vulnerabilities. Countermeasures are described further in Chapter 4.
2.2.3 Knowledge Management
McGraw (46) defines knowledge management as the third pillar of software security.
With the recent changes in computer security towards a paradigm of building security
in, there is a lack of practitioners and experts. Training in security practices and
sharing of security knowledge is increasingly important, meanwhile there are not enough
experienced practitioners to apprentice software architects and developers. Knowledge
management can reform low-scale training techniques by compiling security knowledge
and sharing it widely.
A security knowledge taxonomy groups security knowledge into related catalogues.
This organisation seeks to improve understanding and provide a standard for security
knowledge artefacts. The catalogues also help in mapping knowledge to phases of the
software development lifecycle. Figure 2.4 shows a knowledge schema relating seven
catalogues (11). Principles, guidelines and rules are advice of things to do and not to
do when developing secure software systems. These catalogues span from high-level
architectural principles such as the principle of least privilege (67), to code-level rules
17
2. SOFTWARE SECURITY PRACTICES
such as avoiding insecure string functions in C. Attack patterns, exploits and vulnera-
bilities help recognise and to deal with problems related to security attacks. They are
useful in security analysis and development for example in abuse cases. Historical risk
includes risks and vulnerabilities. These are descriptions of specific incidents from real
software systems and projects. Historical risks include business impact and are useful
for finding similar problems during development of software.
Attack Pattern Exploit
Principle
Guideline
Rule
Vulnerability Historical Risk
1
1
Figure 2.4: Software Security Knowledge Taxonomy - Organisation of software
security knowledge
The catalogues are described in the following paragraphs.
Principles
A principle is a statement of general security wisdom. Principles are derived from expe-
rience, and are useful for diagnosing architectural flaws and practicing secure software
development in general.
Relevant artefacts:
• Security requirements
• Security architecture
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• Software design
Guidelines
A guideline is a recommendation for things to do or to avoid during software develop-
ment. Guidelines are defined for a specific technical context such as operating system
or programming language. Guidelines can uncover and prevent architectural flaws and
implementation bugs.
Relevant artefacts:
• Security requirements
• Software design
• Code
Rules
A rule is a recommendation for things to do or to avoid at the level of syntax. Rules
are for specific programming languages and can be used in code analysis tools. Rules
uncover implementation bugs.
Relevant artefacts:
• Code
Attack patterns
An attack pattern is developed by studying large sets of software exploits. The patterns
can identify the risk that a given exploit will occur in a system. Attack patterns are
useful in designing abuse cases and security tests.
Relevant artefacts:
• Abuse cases
• Software design
• Security test plan
• Penetration tests
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Historical risks
Historical risks are identified in actual software development. These risks are useful
in software development to identify potential security issues at an early stage, because
little analysis is needed since actual risks in similar situations are already documented.
Relevant artefacts:
• Software architecture
• Software design
• Test plans
• Deployed software
Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities are the result of defects in software that can be exploited by malicious
users to abuse the system and its resources. They are useful for understanding how
software vulnerabilities impact the security of a computer system.
Relevant artefacts:
• Software architecture
• Software design
• Penetration test
• Fielded system
Exploits
An exploit is an instance of an attack on a computer system that takes advantage of a
specific vulnerability.
Relevant artefacts:
• Penetration test
• Fielded system
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Documentation of security knowledge is currently dominated by low-level checklists and
taxonomies (46). McGraw et al. presents a taxonomy of security coding errors (84)
with seven groups of errors referred to as kingdoms. The taxonomy is designed to help
programmers avoid security coding errors and to be able to identify possible sources
of errors. They are also expected to increase security awareness and help developers
understand how their work affects security. The taxonomy is a set of rules which are
best fit as input in an automated tool such as static code analysers. Static analysis tools
analyse source code without running the program, highlights coding errors or proves
properties of the code (24).
The following are the seven kingdoms of security coding errors, in order of importance
to software security:
1. Input Validation and Representation
2. API Abuse
3. Security Features
4. Time and State
5. Error Handling
6. Code Quality
7. Encapsulation
Each kingdom consists of a collection of coding errors that share a common theme. The
kingdoms are briefly explained in the following paragraphs. The coding errors described
below are a small excerpt from the taxonomy. See (46) for the complete taxonomy.
Input Validation and Representation
Client input should not be trusted because it may contain malicious data. Input vali-
dation and representation problems are caused by metacharacters, alternate encodings,
numeric representations or lack of input validation in general. Input validation should
be done by a white list technique (33).
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• Buffer Overflow: The result of writing outside the bounds of allocated memory.
This can lead to corrupted data, software crash or cause the execution of an attack
payload.
• Command Injection: Executing commands from an untrusted source. This
can lead to system misuse or attacks to a third party such as legitimate system
users.
API Abuse
Application Programming Interface (API) abuse is caused by violations of the contract
between caller and callee of an API. Examples are making false assumptions about the
behaviour of the API callee, or when the API callee does not correctly implement the
defined interface.
• Dangerous Function: Never use unsafe functions, i.e. functions that have
documented security vulnerabilities.
• Exception Handling: Incorrect handling of exceptions can cause the software
to crash.
Security Features
This kingdom includes features such as authentication, access control, confidentiality,
cryptography and privilege management. The assumption that software security is
about security features alone is a big misconception. Implementing security features
incorrectly is quite common (27).
• Password Management: Storing a password in plaintext.
• Missing Access Control: Access control checks are not performed in all exe-
cution paths.
Time and State
Time and state is relevant to distributed computing. Modern computer systems in-
clude multi-core, multi-CPU or distributed computers interacting and interchanging
information. Time and state errors are related to unexpected interaction between dif-
ferent threads and processes.
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• Deadlock: Inconsistent locking routines can lead to deadlocks potentially stalling
or crashing the system or making resources unavailable.
• Race Conditions: There is a time window between a resource property is
checked and when the resource is used. This can be exploited to launch an attack
or corrupt data.
Error Handling
Security defects related to error handling are very common (48). Not handling errors
at all or insufficient handling introduces great security risk because of two reasons: 1)
errors may give away too much information to possible attackers and 2) improper error
handling may lead to unexpected system state.
• Empty Catch Block: Failing to provide handling of exceptions enables attackers
to induce malicious system behaviour unnoticed.
• Catch NullPointerException : Catching of NullPointerException should not
be used instead of programmatic checks to prevent dereferencing a null pointer.
Code Quality
Code quality affects the system behaviour. Poor code quality can lead to unpredictable
system behaviour, providing attackers a way of stressing the system in unexpected
ways.
• Memory Leak: Failing to free memory results in resource exhaustion.
• Null Dereference: Dereferencing a null pointer causes the program to raise a
NullPointerException.
Encapsulation
Encapsulation with respect to security is about drawing boundaries and setting up
barriers between programming entities. Example boundaries are between classes with
different methods.
• Debug Code: Programmers use debug code to quickly test small units of code.
Debug code might create unintended entry points if not removed before deploy-
ment.
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• Comparing Classes by Name: Comparing classes by name is not sufficient to
decide whether they are the same or differing classes.
There are other collections and taxonomies of security knowledge in security literature
(12). The Seven Kingdoms define a middle ground between rigorous academic studies
and ad hoc collections based on experience (46). The focus on simplicity and practicality
is important with software security taxonomies because there is a lack of experienced
practitioners, and increasing security awareness among software developers is beneficial.
Another popular and useful list is the OWASP Top Ten (26). This list presents a
consensus about what the most critical Web application security flaws are. The list is
developed by a variety of security experts from around the world. The book ’19 Deadly
Sins of Software Security’ (52) is a collection of 19 programming flaws and shows how
to fix them.
Sharing of security knowledge between different parties involved with secure systems
development is an ongoing topic in software security research. It is likely that this will
become an increasingly important part of security knowledge management. Sharing
of security knowledge is of special interest to the work described in this thesis so it is
devoted a chapter of its own, see Chapter 5.
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Security Modelling
Security modelling is a collective term for modelling techniques of security concepts
such as threats, attacks and vulnerabilities. These techniques improve understanding
of security issues so they can be dealt with throughout the development lifecycle. This
chapter describes security modelling as a method and its rationale with respect to
software development. The following modelling techniques are described: attack trees,
abuse and misuse cases, vulnerability cause graphs, security activity graphs and threat
modelling.
3.1 The Need for Methods and Tools
Complex software is dealing with critical information and controlling systems in mil-
itary, financial, medical and governmental organizations, making consequences of a
security breach very dangerous. The complexity of software is related to attack ability.
Security faults are a subset of quality faults, and quality faults tend to be a function of
code complexity which is again proportional to code volume (32; 46). Developers need
to understand and deal with how their complex programs affect security.
Studies performed on e-business applications show that 70% of found security defects
are design related (37). The same study also showed that 47% of the application secu-
rity defects should be regarded as severe design flaws, which means they are exploitable
and could cause loss of revenue. This is connected with the fact that security is rarely
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introduced in early stages of software development. The current focus is to detect prob-
lems rather than preventing them (49). Developers are not creating insecure software
because they do not know how to code, flaws are introduced at a higher level of soft-
ware development. A thorough understanding of security at a higher level is needed
and abstractions other than code units should be introduced to enable developers to
gain control on security at the level of a complete software system.
A lot of different terminology is used in security literature; in the following some core
security concepts are defined to remove any ambiguity. The definitions (70) are essential
to software security and security modelling, and will be used extensively throughout
the thesis:
• Asset - Assets are information or resources which have value to an organization
or person.
• Stakeholder - an organization or person who places a particular value on assets.
• Security Objective - a security objective is a statement of intent to counter threats
and satisfy identified security needs.
• Threat - a potential for a security breach of an asset.
• Attack - an attack is an action that violates the security of an asset.
• Vulnerability - is a flaw or weakness that could be exploited to breach the security
of an asset.
• Countermeasure - action taken in order to protect an asset against threats.
• Risk - a risk is the product of two parameters: the probability (P) that a successful
attack occurs and Impact (I), i.e. expected loss. This is expressed by the formula
R = P * I
The definitions are related and together they form a framework where software devel-
opers are able to gain an understanding of their software and its environment with
respect to security. Security modelling is a method where these concepts are evaluated
by the use of various modelling techniques in a systematic fashion. Security modelling
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integrated in the software development process, is expected to improve security in soft-
ware by helping developers prevent potential attacks (8). The importance of security
modelling is based on the following assumptions:
Increased security awareness. Security failure data should be fed into some qual-
ity assurance process, as is usually the case with other software quality requirements.
Software engineers generally do however not use security failure data to improve the
security of the software they develop (59). Providing up-to-date information on se-
curity problems to developers is an important step towards building secure software.
This information should be combined with practices to reduce the security problems.
Software developers can not design, develop and test secure software systems without
knowing the security issues (34). Developers need to be aware of how security faults are
introduced in artefacts throughout the whole software development lifecycle, including
the early stages with requirements and design, and the threats to a deployed software
product.
Need for security methods and tools. Most current approaches to software secu-
rity apply some best practices, e.g. secure programming techniques, in a rather ad hoc
manner. Experience shows that these approaches help prevent software vulnerabilities,
hence the term best practice, there is however a need for completeness in understanding
and dealing with security issues. An ad hoc security program will not give assurance
regarding what threats and vulnerabilities that are dealt with by each security prac-
tice. Security practices, techniques and tools should be applied throughout the whole
development process in a systematic fashion to help development of secure software sys-
tems (7). Systematic prevention of software vulnerabilities requires an understanding
of the causes of vulnerability, the threats they expose and how they can be exploited
by attackers. Without this understanding, developers have no assurance that security
risks are in fact mitigated by the chosen countermeasures. Structuring security prac-
tices, techniques and tools is a way of achieving a predictable and measurable secure
development process.
Security modelling is a method that may change the ’penetrate and patch’ behaviour
of security, because it applies to all stages of development and its output is meant to
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be kept updated as threats change. Increased security awareness is a direct benefit
of security modelling. It is unlikely that implementing vulnerability countermeasures
without a thorough security model will produce secure software, because choosing the
right countermeasures requires an understanding of threats and exposures. This is
backed up by The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), which states
that threat modelling is essential for design of new Web applications to be able to
mitigate the important security risks (66). Security modelling provides a context for
use of software security tools because it defines a foundation that can be used to select
proper tools and methods.
Security modelling tools can be used to model security effectively and enables sharing
of security knowledge between parties involved with secure software development. The
specific functionality of security modelling tools is not defined in security literature be-
cause security modelling tools are practically non-existent. Security modelling is done
with general-purpose drawing tools (8), such as UML (31) tools. Work is ongoing to
make software development tools make use of security models from security modelling
tools. This is very relevant to the work presented in this thesis and will be further
described in Chapter 5. The lack of tools is based on the fact that security modelling
is mainly practiced by a small number of security experts and researchers. Software
developers often use models, e.g. when working with architecture, design and deploy-
ment, but security rarely takes part in these models because languages and tools do
not support security modelling. Microsoft’s Threat Modeling Tool (55) is an exception
to this, and allows users to create threat models for software applications. The tool
captures threat models in machine-readable form for storage and updating. The Threat
Modeling Tool is designed for Microsoft’s threat modeling method, which narrows the
potential use cases and makes it less suited for general security modelling as described
in this thesis. Prototype tools such as SeaMonster, which is an open source security
modelling tool, shows that there is interest among security researchers to develop new
modelling tools for security. SeaMonster is described in detail in Chapter 8.
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3.2 Modelling Techniques
There are several security modelling techniques, which in general can be grouped by
their output: vulnerabilities and their causes, threats, attacks or countermeasures. The
aim of the techniques is to gain an understanding of security issues to be able to deal
with them throughout the software development lifecycle.
3.2.1 Threat Modeling
Threat modeling (80; 83) is a part of the Microsoft Trustworthy Computing Security
Development Lifecycle (43). Threat modeling is usually performed in the design or
specification phase of a development process, to understand a product’s threat envi-
ronment and defend against potential attacks. Six activities define the threat modeling
process:
1. Scoping the process. Threat modeling an entire product is often too complex.
Logical groups of functionality is grouped into components, which are then subject
to threat modeling.
2. Gathering background information. Information from the component’s spec-
ifications are gathered. Examples are use cases, deployment configuration, de-
pendencies on other components, features or technologies and implementation
assumptions.
3. Describing the component. This activity gives a security-focused description
of the component’s design. Entry points (interfaces with other software, hardware
and users) are identified and given a trust level which describes the degree to which
the entry point can be trusted to send or receive data. A list should be made
of trust levels required to gain access to protected assets. Microsoft recommends
the use of data-flow diagrams (DFDs).
4. Obtaining threats. Threats can be obtained through a brainstorming meet-
ing, analysing DFDs to identify possible threats. The acronym STRIDE (spoof-
ing, tampering, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of
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privilege) can be used to help remember the types of threats a component might
be exposed.
5. Resolving threats. Decide what actions are needed to resolve the threats, and
execute them.
6. Following up. Tracking your own dependencies, verifying your assumptions and
communicating security requirements. Changes made to the design should also
be tracked throughout the product development cycle to ensure that the changes
do not introduce holes in the security threat mitigations.
3.2.2 Attack Trees
Attack trees (AT) (69) describe possible threats or attacks to a system. By identifying
how a system can be attacked and understanding the attacker, we may be able to
design and implement proper countermeasures to thwart the attacks. Attack trees
model attacks as a tree structure, with the goal as the root node and possible ways of
achieving the goal as leaf nodes. The goal is a successful attack. Alternatives can be
represented by OR nodes, AND nodes express that several steps are needed to perform
an attack. A metric representing the cost or feasibility of an attack can be added
to perform calculations on likelihood. Possible metrics are possible/impossible and
monetary cost. Figure 3.1 shows an example attack tree with three ways of achieving
unauthorized access to a system; by guessing a legitimate user’s password, performing
a buffer overflow attack and by performing a cross-site scripting attack (XSS).
Figure 3.1: Attack Tree Example - Achieve unauthorized access
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You create an attack tree by selecting a goal as the root node. Identify possible attacks
for the root node, and then continue down the tree. Repeat for all nodes until you
have exhausted possible attacks, and possibly pass the tree to someone else so they
can add their attacks. Making useful attack trees requires thinking like an attacker,
often referred to as a black hat approach in security literature (46). A black hat means
applying desctructive thinking to abuse a computer system, to understand the motive,
method, tools and desired results of attacks.
3.2.3 Abuse and Misuse Cases
Use cases (23) are used during elicitation and documentation of functional requirements
to capture a system’s normative behaviour, but there is little support for other types
of requirements such as security. McDermott and Fox (44) suggested abuse cases in
1999 to express threats using standard UML use case notation. Sindre and Opdahl (76)
suggested misuse cases which are negative use cases specifying undesirable behaviour in
a system. Security requirements are elicited by documenting how the system is to react
on exceptional cases such as illegitimate use. A use case can describe a countermeasure
that mitigates a threat; the misuse case. A misuse case will exploit or hinder legitimate
use cases. Abuse and misuse cases force developers to think like attackers, what do
they want to achieve and how. Alexander (4) advocates using abuse and misuse cases
to conduct threat analysis during requirements analysis. The differences in abuse and
misuse cases are not important for this work, so the term misuse case will be used to
cover these techniques. Røstad (77) has suggested to further specify the misuser, the
actor that initiates misuse cases, as inside or outside attacker. This is adopted in further
misuse cases in this thesis. Figure 3.2 shows an example misuse case diagram. An
insider, the Developer, has forgot to remove debug code before software release, leaving
a backdoor entry point to the program, shown as Backdoor in the figure. Vulnerabilities
can be exploited thus introducing a threat to the system. The threat is represented by
the misuse case Steal payment credentials which exploits the Backdoor vulnerability.
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Figure 3.2: Misuse Case Example - Online payment
3.2.4 Vulnerability Cause Graphs
A vulnerability cause graph (VCG) (15) is used to analyse causes of vulnerabilities to
prevent them in future software development. The causes of a vulnerability and their
relationships are represented as a directed acyclic graph, with a single vulnerability as
the root node. Internal nodes are causes, events and conditions during the software
development process that may be the cause of a vulnerability. The semantics of a VCG
is based on the predecessor-relationship: to prevent a cause C, either C itself or all
predecessors of C must be mitigated. To prevent a vulnerability, all predecessors of the
root node in the vulnerability’s VCG must be prevented. There are four types of nodes
in a VCG:
• Simple node: represents a condition or event that may contribute to a vulnera-
bility.
• Compound node: combination of causes that form a VCG on their own.
• Conjunction: conjunction of two or more nodes.
32
3.2 Modelling Techniques
• Root node: the vulnerability modelled by the VCG.
Countermeasures can be derived by identifying activities that mitigate causes in the
graph. The goal is to prevent the vulnerability to materialise by using the information in
the structure of the VCG (6; 7). VCGs model vulnerabilities and need a supplementary
technique to identify countermeasures. Identifying causes to software vulnerabilities is
however an important first step towards more secure software.
Figure 3.3 shows an example VCG of the vulnerability group Injection flaws. These
flaws allow user-supplied data to trick the system into executing unintended commands.
In the example, there are three main causes: 1) The cause Accepts malicious input al-
lows attackers to pass malicious data to the system, including executable code and data
formats not supported by the system. An underlying cause for this liberal input scheme
is Lack of input restrictions in system documentation. 2) Unrestricted privileges give
attackers the ability to perform system operations they are not intended to. Injected
commands should not be able to perform restricted operations such as file access. 3)
The third cause, Use of unsafe APIs, are programming interfaces that are not con-
sidered secure. Examples of these are exploited character escaping functions. Code
complexity is identified as an underlying cause. Abundant code complexity makes the
program code difficult to review by security engineers, allowing use of unsafe APIs to
slip through quality assurance.
3.2.5 Security Activity Graphs
A security activity graph (SAG) (7) relates activities during software development to
prevent potential vulnerabilities. By creating a SAG for every vulnerability, the goal
is to identify countermeasures to prevent potential security vulnerabilities. SAG is a
graphical representation of terms in first order predicate calculus, the graphs allow
better readability and annotation with metadata (7).
The graph contains a tree structure, with the vulnerability as the root node. Other
nodes are activities that influence security and take on boolean values. There are
no restrictions on activities other than that they are meant to improve the security
of a software product. The security touchpoints in Section 2.2.2 are good examples
33
3. SECURITY MODELLING
Figure 3.3: Vulnerability Cause Graph Example - Injection flaws
of possible activities. An activity is true if it is implemented perfectly during software
development and is false otherwise. Activities can be arranged by software development
phases such as analysis, design, implementation, testing and deployment. It is possible
to assign cost metrics to activities; this might help produce a feasibility or ranking
scheme. Relationships between nodes can be defined using logic gates which are a
function of their input. Table 3.1 defines the graph elements and their logic equivalents.
Security activity graphs are tightly coupled with vulnerability cause graphs, and can
be created from a VCG by a structured method following three simple steps:
1. Enumerate mitigation techniques for each cause.
2. Create SAG fragments for each set of mitigation techniques.
3. Combine the fragments to create a complete graph.
The following is an example which follows the above method to produce a SAG from
the vulnerability cause graph in Figure 3.3. Figure 3.4 shows the resulting graph.
Step 1:
Mitigation techniques are identified for each cause of the VCG, shown in Table 3.2.
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Graphical representation Function Logic Equivalent
AND
AND gate F = I1 ∩ I2 ∩ ... ∩ In
OR
OR gate F = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ ... ∪ In
S
SPLIT gate F1 = I, F2 = I, ..., Fn = I
C
Activity F = C
Name
Vulnerability N/A
Table 3.1: Security Activity Graph Elements - Gates are a logical function F of
their input I
Step 2:
SAG fragments are created for each set of mitigation techniques. One fragment is
created for the input validation techniques and one for the changes in the use of APIs.
Validation of input and rejection of invalid input are connected and must be applied
in conjunction. Enforcing least privilege is added because all system access should be
governed by a minimal privilege policy. The first fragment is an AND-node connecting
these three techniques. The second fragment is a conjunction of static code analysis and
use of safe APIs. Enforcing least privilege is equally important, so it is combined with
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Figure 3.4: Security Activity Graph Example - Modelling injection flaws
the other two techniques. As in the first fragment, the resulting graph is an AND-node
connecting the three techniques.
Step 3:
The fragments are combined into a security activity graph. The graph shows that to
mitigate injection flaws, two paths are possible: 1) a conjunction of input validation,
invalid input rejection and enforcing least privilege activities, or 2) a conjunction of
static code analysis, use of safe APIs and enforcing least privilege. It should be noted
that this example is not a complete analysis of injection flaw vulnerabilities. The
resulting SAG is only intended as an example of this modelling technique.
For a given SAG there are likely several different sets of activities that satisfy the
semantic function, ideally one wants to find the optimal set. A set could be optimal in
terms of cost, efficiency, implementation speed etc. Automatic selection would require
tool support for cost modelling and finding an optimal solution to the semantic function
of the SAG.
VCGs and SAGs primary use is to understand vulnerabilities such that developers are
able to identify and implement countermeasures, and finally producing secure software.
These modelling techniques require tool support because the graphs are likely to be
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Cause Mitigation Description
Lack of input restrictions Validate input All possible legal input to the
system is specified through re-
quirements.
Accepts malicious input Reject invalid input Input which do not pass the
validation mechanism is re-
jected.
Unrestricted privileges Enforce least privilege All users should have a mini-
mal set of privileges when con-
necting to backend systems
such as databases or commu-
nication modules. A minimal
set defines the needed priv-
ileges to perform the opera-
tions the system is designed
for.
Code complexity Static code analysis Analysing complex code can
effectively be done by code
analysis tools. These tools
can detect use of unsafe APIs
or implementation bugs.
Use of unsafe APIs Use safe APIs Strongly typed parameterized
query APIs with placeholder
substitution markers. These
handle all data escaping so use
of unsafe escaping functions is
not necessary.
Table 3.2: Creating a Security Activity Graph - Step 1
large and hard to maintain or keep track of (7).
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Chapter 4
Countermeasures
In Section 3.1 a countermeasure was defined as an action taken in order to protect
an asset against threats and attacks. Such actions are not limited to technical software
artefacts, but can refer to any action designed to reduce the risk of attacks and software
misuse. As an example, a countermeasure to the threat of inside attacks is to dismiss
any disloyal employee. The countermeasures in this chapter is limited to those rele-
vant to the software development process and related artefacts, and includes security
patterns and reviews.
4.1 Security Patterns
A software pattern describes a recurring problem that arises in specific contexts, and
presents a well-proven generic solution. The solution can form multiple concrete instan-
tiations, and has become a pattern through many successful implementations, proving
itself as a best practice. The use of patterns has been adopted in the security field. A
substantial collection of security patterns has been developed (41; 71; 78). The defi-
nition of a security pattern (72) has the same key characteristics as general software
patterns:
A security pattern describes a particular recurring security problem that
arises in specific contexts and presents a well-proven generic scheme for its
solution.
39
4. COUNTERMEASURES
Patterns appear to be valuable to secure systems development due to several advan-
tages:
• Security knowledge is structured in an effective and understandable way. The
knowledge in a pattern is constructive rather than presenting a laundry list of
what not to do.
• There is currently a large gap between theory and practice in the field of software
security, because developers do not know much about security and security experts
do not necessarily know much about development (46). Security professionals are
primarily concerned with the security of a system while system developers main
concern is to get the system working. Patterns can be used to bridge the gap
by making developers able to analyse the trade-offs between security and other
requirements without the presence of a security professional (40).
• The pattern representation is known to most software developers (71). This
enables patterns to be used as an effective medium for learning security knowledge.
• Much of the focus on computer and information security until now has been on
low-level implementation and reactive network-based countermeasures, such as
firewalls and cryptographic techniques. Patterns can be applied at any level from
enterprise issues to architecture and design or low-level implementation such as
programming language specific constructs. The pattern approach can help extend
the security focus to include all phases of secure systems development.
Proper documentation of patterns is necessary to be able to understand and discuss
them. This documentation should provide all the needed information to know when the
pattern can be applied and how to implement the pattern. There are many variations
of pattern descriptions, the one adopted here is taken from (14) because it is thorough
and descriptive. This format suits a wide range of patterns, including security patterns:
Name
The name of the pattern.
Also Known As
Possible other known names.
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Example
An example that demonstrates the problem in practice and shows why this
pattern is useful.
Context
The situations in which the pattern may apply.
Problem
The problem addressed by the pattern.
Solution
The fundamental solution provided by the pattern. Fundamental implies a
generic principle which can be utilised in different instances.
Structure
A detailed specification of the structural aspects of the pattern. This often
refers but is not limited, to software components and their relations in some
appropriate notation.
Dynamics
Scenarios describing run-time behaviour of the pattern.
Implementation
Guidelines for implementing the pattern.
Example Resolved
Discussion of important aspects with respect to the example.
Variants
A brief description of variants or specialisations of the pattern.
Known Uses
Examples of use in existing systems.
Consequences
Benefits and possible liabilities by using this pattern.
See Also
References to related patterns. This could be patterns that solve similar or
related problems or patterns that improve potential liabilities introduced
by the applied pattern.
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It should be noted that not all elements of this description is needed for every pattern.
The following is an example security pattern from (41), dealing with input in Web
applications. The pattern representation adopted in this example is inspired by (14).
Name
Client Input Filters
Also Known As
Untrusted Client, Server-Side Validation, Sanity Checking
Example
Internet banking require customers to fill in account numbers and other personal
information through forms. The server receiving the user supplied information does
not trust the client side. When the client initiates a transaction, the server checks
that all the parameters are valid before executing it.
Context
Any application accepting user input. The main concern is Web applications.
Problem
Web sites are highly interactive applications which require the user to submit some
type of input. The server-side application logic can not treat the input as trusted
because there are no guarantees that the input follows the format and range origi-
nally intended by application designers. This is because input from clients can be
tampered with and it may be submitted by non-legitimate users.
Solution
All data provided by the client should be treated as malicious and filtered at the
server. Client-side input validation can be used to give proper feedback through the
user interface, but all validations must be repeated on the server. The server-side
filter must deal with the following (the list is not exhaustive):
• Text input submitted by the user should be filtered to eliminate scripting
tags and other questionable content.
• Suspiciously long URLs and header fields should be dropped and possibly
logged.
• Calculated fields provided by the client should be ignored and recomputed at
the server when the data is processed.
• Sensitive data that must be stored on the client should be kept in an en-
crypted, tamper-proof form.
Client filters should be able to modify requests before delivering them to the in-
tended object. If the data cannot easily be fixed, the client filter should reject
or simply drop the request. All filtering events should be reported to the central
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logging mechanism, although many will be benign, they might indicate a pattern
of attempted misuse. If a filter detects an obvious attempt to sidestep the security
of the system, the request should be blocked and the event reported.
Structure
Input validation can be integrated into the requested objects, or they can be im-
plemented as separate objects. The second alternative is less efficient but easier to
manage. In either case, the essential is that the filters are always invoked before
any processing of the client input. The structure of the pattern is described in
Figure 4.1. A logging mechanism is added with a dotted connection because this
component is not a part of this pattern but is recommended as a related pattern.
-request(parameters)
Filter
 
Client 
 
 
Server 
Object 1
Object n
Logger
...
System
Figure 4.1: Client Input Filters - Pattern structure
Consequences
Consequences of using the pattern are provided benefits and potential liabilities.
See Table 4.1.
Related Patterns
Log for Audit
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Impact on Consequence
Availability If overly sensitive, this pattern can have an adverse effect on avail-
ability, preventing legitimate users from using the site.
Integrity This pattern greatly enhances the integrity of the data processed
by a web site.
Manageability The management burden could be increased if overly sensitive san-
ity checks result in a high number of false reports of attacks that
must be investigated.
Performance This pattern will incur a small performance penalty, since it re-
quires some time to perform checks. If data is stored in encrypted
form on the client, encrypting and decrypting the data will also
exact a performance hit.
Cost This pattern has fixed implementation costs. However, if overly
sensitive it could increase the customer service burden on the site.
Table 4.1: Client Input Filters consequences
Security literature describes a wide range of security expert knowledge as security pat-
terns. Some categorisation scheme is useful to narrow scope and remove ambiguity
when referring to different types of patterns. Security patterns can be organised in two
groups (88):
• Structural patterns. These patterns will affect the implementation of the final
product, and are represented as structures and interactions. They are used when
defining software components.
• Procedural patterns. These patterns are used for process improvement to support
development of enterprise level security strategy. Risk assessment often plays a
central part in these patterns.
The organisation above is very coarse-grained and can be further defined by introduc-
ing dimensions of development stage or software abstraction level. Structural patterns
are often defined as architectural or design patterns. These patterns deal specifically
with problems at their respective levels of software development. This thesis is con-
cerned with structural patterns, specifically design patterns. Unless otherwise is stated,
security pattern will refer to security design pattern in following chapters.
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4.1.1 Security Patterns as a Countermeasure
The work in (13) introduced security design patterns in software design tools to help
developers create more secure software by increasing security awareness and making
security a part of the design lifecycle. Design templates of two recognised security
patterns were implemented in a design tool. The templates were applied in a case
study, which showed how security vulnerabilities could be avoided at the design level
by giving software developers security pattern tool support. This work is an important
prerequisite for this thesis and is described in the following paragraphs.
Enterprise Architect (EA) (82) is a tool for designing and constructing software systems.
EA supports UML design pattern templates which are UML documents that can be
instantiated in software designs. The pattern support was extended with security pat-
tern templates of the Intercepting Validator (78) and Role-Based Access Control (71)
patterns. Figure 4.2 shows the Intercepting Validator template in EA. The template
is a UML class diagram describing the static structures of the pattern. The pattern
instantiation dialogue is shown in Figure 4.3. Pattern instantiation allows patterns to
be merged with existing designs or creating a new design starting with the pattern
structures.
Figure 4.2: Intercepting Validator - Class diagram of the Intercepting Validator in
Enterprise Architect.
The implemented pattern templates were tested in a case study. The case defined a sys-
tem for administration of medical patient journals. The system requirements specified
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Figure 4.3: Pattern Instantiation in Enterprise Architect - Instantiation dialogue
that confidentiality and integrity of medical information must be ensured. The case
study implementation was to show how security patterns can be instantiated through
the software design tool in order to countermeasure vulnerabilities and mitigate security
risk. An ad hoc instantiation process, shown in Figure 4.4, was designed to demonstrate
the use of security pattern templates. Although this process can not be defined as a
complete threat and countermeasure identification process, it resembles the stages fol-
lowed and artefacts produced in most software development projects. Use cases, system
requirements (already specified by the case) and initial design documents were used in
a risk analysis where assets and threats and were identified. The STRIDE categories
were used to identify the following threats: data disclosure and data tampering. Input
validation and access control mechanisms were identified as countermeasures through
the risk analysis. The process did not define any method or tool to identify these coun-
termeasures based on threats. The countermeasures were simply chosen based on the
author’s software security knowledge and various vulnerability countermeasure sources
(26; 71). After mechanisms to mitigate the risks were identified, the security patterns in
the design tool were searched for a matching countermeasure mechanism and pattern.
This was performed by browsing the descriptions of the pattern templates. The chosen
pattern templates were then instantiated in a software design. The templates were
instantiated in the medical journal system which was then implemented as a prototype
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Web application. The mitigation of security risk was demonstrated by failed injection
attacks to the system.
1: Use Cases and Requirements
2: Threat Modelling
3: Pattern Search
4: Pattern Instantiation
5: Remaining Design
Pattern 
implements 
countermeasure
Pattern and 
countermeasure 
mismatch
Figure 4.4: Pattern Instantiation Workflow - Pattern instantiation through design
tools
The described case study displays a shortcoming in current secure systems development.
There are methods to analyse and deal with security problems, i.e. risk management
frameworks, threat modelling and security modelling, but there is a lack of methods and
tools to tie these methods to activities in software development phases, i.e. design and
implementation. Software developers do not have support for security modelling and
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secure development techniques in development tools. This is contributing to the security
knowledge gap. The author found that the security pattern templates of the described
work will not provide enough assurance that the chosen patterns countermeasure the
identified security risks. There is a need for a tool and method to assure that developers
have chosen the right security patterns to counter vulnerabilities.
4.2 Architectural Analysis and Reviews
The analysis methods and reviews presented in this section are based on software archi-
tecture and design. The objective of these methods is to gather data to be able to make
decisions based on knowledge about vulnerabilities, threats, impacts and probability.
Modern approaches to risk analysis emphasise the importance of an architectural view
and starting the analysis process early in the development lifecycle (22). This allows
security defects to be avoided or mitigated at an early stage. Equally important is that
security is meaningless without context. Security analysis and improvement activities
must be coupled with the actual software product being built. Security can not be
achieved just by adding some standard add-on security package. Founding security
risk management on architecture and design artefacts allow explicit definitions of what
needs to be secured, from who and what the software must be secured and for how long
it can be considered secure.
When performing architectural analysis and reviews, choosing the right people is impor-
tant (22). Risk analysis requires an understanding of potential business impact which
depends on laws, regulations and business model. The system developers might build
assumptions about the system and possible security risks, often based on implicit as-
sumptions which might make them overlook possible sources of risk. Analysts external
to the design and development team might help challenge these assumptions. System
experts do however hold a lot of knowledge which is useful to analysis and reviews,
advocating a combination of internal and external team members.
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4.2.1 Architectural Risk Analysis
A distinction should be drawn between risk analysis and risk management (46). Risk
analysis is about identifying risk and finding mitigation strategies. Risk management
refers to tracking and mitigating risks through the development lifecycle. This section
describes the basis of architectural risk analysis which has earned its importance to
security through the high account of design-related security problems (22; 37).
There exists a wide range of risk analysis methods, some of these are briefly described in
Table 4.2. Some methods calculate a value of an information asset and determine risk
as a function of loss and probability; others use checklists of threats and vulnerabilities
to determine a risk measurement.
Method Developer Reference
Commercial
STRIDE Microsoft (35)
Security Risk Management Guide Microsoft (54)
ACSM/SAR Sun described in (30)
Cigital’s architectural risk analysis process Cigital (46)
Standards-Based
ASSET NIST http://csrc.nist.gov/asset
OCTAVE SEI (3)
Table 4.2: Risk Analysis Methods
McGraw (22) describes a prototypical analysis approach with a set of activities. These
activities are rather general and can be fitted to suit a wider range of methods. It is
valuable in capturing the essence of a risk analysis method, and describes the following
activities:
Learn as much as possible about the target of analysis. Study the specifica-
tions, architecture and design documents. Include possible other artefacts, e.g. code.
Identify threats and sources of attack. The learning activity is suited for brainstorming
sessions and group discussion.
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Discuss security issues surrounding the software. Discuss how the system works
and note areas of disagreement or ambiguity. Identify vulnerabilities, exploits and
possible fixes. Understand planned security controls because these may introduce new
security risks.
Determine probability of compromise. Describe attack scenarios for exploits of
vulnerabilities. The likelihood of compromise is a function of protection and threat
capacity.
Perform impact analysis. Determine impacts on assets and business goals.
Rank risks. Risk analysis is a decision-support tool. Ranking the risks is a way of
guiding the judgement calls to be made regarding risk mitigation.
Develop mitigation strategy. Recommend specific countermeasures to mitigate
risks.
Report findings. Describe risks with attention to impact. It is important that
decision makers have the information needed to spend limited mitigation resources
effectively.
4.2.2 Architectural Reviews
Deliverables of software development activities can be made subject to software reviews
which is a process examining the deliverable and providing approvals or comments. The
review can be performed by any interested party, e.g. project personnel, managers,
users, customers or owners. The deliverable can be any technical document such as
project plans, budgets, requirements documents, specifications, design, source code etc.
The goal of performing a review is to assess the quality of the software product and
possibly identify defects or weaknesses. The review process may be governed by a set of
written rules, the degree of formality in different review methods vary greatly as will be
seen from the summary of review and inspection techniques. The IEEE Standard for
50
4.2 Architectural Analysis and Reviews
Software Reviews (36) defines a common set of activities for software reviews. These
are closely linked to the software inspection process developed by Fagan (25). The
activities are:
• Overview: Qualified personnel ensures that reviewers understand the goals of the
review, procedures and the available materials.
• Preparation: Examination of the review materials for anomalies, i.e. defects
according to the review goals.
• Examination: Reviewers pool their findings to agree on the status of the reviewed
artefact.
• Rework: Assigned personnel, possibly the developer of the artefact, performs
actions to correct anomalies and defects.
• Follow-up: Ensure that corrective actions are applied correctly.
There are obvious benefits to architectural software reviews, one is that it enables early
detection of defects (63). It enables developers to identify defects earlier than what is
possible during testing and operations feedback. Gilliam et al. (29) recommends intro-
ducing a form of security review in every phase of the software development lifecycle.
McGraw (47) points out the importance of external analysis, i.e. by someone outside
the design team. Having an independent view of the system is important because the
designers and developers are often sceptical that their system may have flaws. Software
reviews are a way of performing external analysis.
Performing architectural risk analysis and reviews is knowledge intensive (46). Re-
viewers need some security expertise to be able to identify anomalies. This knowledge
may come from the experience of the reviewers or more explicit sources such as security
checklists, vulnerability/threat/attack lists or compilations. Examples are the STRIDE
(35) model of risk categories, attack patterns (33), design principles (86) or security
issues in widely used frameworks such as .NET or Java.
The IEEE 1028-1997 standard defines five types of reviews:
• Management review - a review performed by management to evaluate work status.
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• Technical review - qualified technical personnel reviews the software product for
discrepancies between the product and specifications.
• Inspection - a formal review where reviewers follow a process to find defects.
• Walkthrough - an informal review where the product author leads reviewers
through the product and the reviewers may point out defects or ambiguities
through questions or comments.
• Audit - the goal of this review is to evaluate compliance with specifications,
standards, contracts or other criteria.
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Sharing Security Knowledge
This chapter gives a rationale for sharing security knowledge and describes state-of-
the-art mechanisms such as widely used vulnerability repositories. The chapter also
describes past and present work in the connection between security knowledge repos-
itories and development tools and methods. Sharing security knowledge and applying
it during development is a hot topic in current software security research.
5.1 Why Sharing is Important
Security knowledge management is a set of activities concerning collection, encapsu-
lation and sharing of expert security knowledge. The sharing of security knowledge
is perhaps the most important because of the current state of software security. This
is based on two observations: 1) the importance of expert knowledge in software se-
curity and 2) the knowledge gap between software practitioners and security experts.
Being able to recognise situations where common attacks can be applied is crucial in
effective risk assessment (47). This requires expert knowledge. The literature describes
a security knowledge gap (46; 85) between software developers and security experts
or engineers. There are sources of security knowledge, they are however not available
or accessible to those who need them the most; those directly involved with software
development. Sharing of security knowledge can build consensus on best practices and
standardisation of secure development methods and tools. This collaboration is critical
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to making software security a unified practice (46). Work in sharing security knowledge
includes defining knowledge constructs such as taxonomies, catalogues etc., and tools
and methods.
5.2 Vulnerability Repositories
There are several publicly available vulnerability repositories or databases. They pro-
vide informal descriptions, catalogues and information about patches to repair vul-
nerabilities. SecurityFocus (74) is among the most well-known sources of security in-
formation on the Web, with over 18 million page views a month. The SecurityFocus
vulnerability database provides vulnerabilities that can be browsed by vendor, title,
version and CVE. CVE is a dictionary of publicly known information security vul-
nerabilities and exposures (58). The dictionary provides a list of standardised names
for vulnerabilities, and enables data exchange between security products by the use
of CVE’s common identifiers. BugTraq is a mailing list related to the SecurityFocus
community for disclosure and discussion of computer security vulnerabilities. The Na-
tional Vulnerability Database (60), hosted by NIST, is a U.S. government repository of
security vulnerability management data. Similar to SecurityFocus, vulnerabilities can
be searched by several attributes; keywords, vendor, version, CVE etc. The database
contains over 29.000 CVE vulnerabilities and 13.000 vulnerable products. The Open
Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) (62) is an independent vulnerability database
aiming to provide accurate and unbiased technical information about security vulnera-
bilities. OSVDB keeps mappings to CVE and can be exported to XML so that anyone
can keep a local copy of a OSVDB snapshot. The advanced search interface of the
database is very sophisticated with its vulnerability classification scheme, see Figure
5.1.
Other vulnerability repositories and mailing lists are the Secunia Vulnerability Archive
(73), ISS X-Force Alerts and Advisories (81), Packet Storm Advisories (2), CA Vulner-
ability Information Center (10), Cerias’ CoopVDB (16) and the Open Web Application
Security Project (65). Each of these repositories does not individually cover all aspects
of a vulnerability, and they lack a common format (64). The chosen representations of
vulnerabilities are varying from repository to repository, and the informal descriptions
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Figure 5.1: OSVDB Vulnerability Search Interface - Advanced search
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are difficult to utilise in automated tools. The vulnerabilities are usually system specific
and are counter measured by patches, making the repositories more useful for system
administrators than software developers. There is a lack of knowledge sharing reposi-
tories and architectures for general software security knowledge that can be applied at
development time.
5.3 Security Knowledge at Development Time
Schumacher et al. (72) describes a prototype security pattern search engine as a security
improvement tool. The engine is implemented as an expert system with three main
components:
• Security Knowledge Base - contains core security concepts and taxonomies to-
gether with a mapping to the structure of security patterns.
• Inference Engine - processes the user queries, applies the query to the knowledge
base according to a set of inference rules, and presents answers.
• User Interface - Web interface receiving user input and presenting output.
Figure 5.2 shows the use cases of the security pattern search engine. The system seeks
to help users solve typical security problems at different layers of abstraction. Users
can search and explore patterns and simulate pattern scenarios which explore the con-
sequences of applying a pattern. The knowledge base is maintained by security experts,
shown as Expert and Pattern Author in the figure. A pattern author can access a library
of predefined pattern elements, e.g. threats or countermeasures. A Hierarchy Builder
is intended to identify relations between patterns to compute a pattern hierarchy.
SHIELDS (75) is an EU project launched in January 2008 concerned with detection
and elimination of software vulnerabilities through security models. The objective is
to increase software security by providing software practitioners methods and tools to
prevent occurrences of known vulnerabilities. The project will conduct research and
development on modelling software security vulnerabilities and countermeasures, cre-
ating a repository for storage and distribution of the models, and extending security
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Expert
Pattern Author
User
Security Pattern Search Engine
Edit Rules
Edit Queries
Edit Concepts Explore Patterns
Search Patterns
Simulate Scenario
Edit Patterns
Access Library
Hierarchy Builder
Figure 5.2: Security Pattern Search Engine - Use cases
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development tools and methods to use the repository. The technical approach of the
project is based on a knowledge repository known as the Security Vulnerability Repos-
itory Service (SVRS) (8). The service is to be made internet-accessible and defines the
following use scenarios through supported security tools:
• Security experts can represent and publish formal vulnerability models that can
be used by development and security tools.
• Help developers detect and remove software vulnerabilities from within their de-
velopment tools.
• Gather metrics about vulnerabilities detected and removed, to be used in process
improvement intitiatives.
• Provide information about design and code conformance to security policies.
Figure 5.3 shows the SVRS and suggested tools for software security.
Figure 5.3: Security Vulnerability Repository Service - Main components and
actors
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The SVRS enables software practitioners and development tools to stay up-to-date with
the latest security knowledge. The repository approach is designed for fast dissemina-
tion of security information from security experts to software developers, hoping to
bridge the security knowledge gap. The SHIELDS project will also create a SHIELDS
Verified certification to help development organisations document that known security
vulnerabilities are not present in their software products. The certification refers to
quality processes and mechanisms.
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Part III
Contribution
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Chapter 6
Research Agenda
This chapter describes the research design of the thesis. A hypothesis and research
objectives are stated in the light of previous work and tendencies in current software
development practices. A research process is tailored to fit the hypothesis and a work
plan is included which describes milestone activities.
6.1 Hypothesis and Objectives
The preliminary study showed a shortcoming in state-of-the art secure software devel-
opment practice; security is rarely taking part throughout the entire software lifecycle.
Many companies treat security as an add-on typically done after an application is de-
ployed. This is confirmed by studies performed on e-business applications, showing
that 70% of found security defects are design related and 47% of these defects can be
regarded as severe design flaws (37). This suggests that the old security approach based
on security software and a patch-and-repair strategy is not enough. We need to focus
on the applications themselves. The lack of security work in early stages of development
is partly based on lack of methods, tools and security awareness in general, as pointed
out in the preliminary study. Although design flaws impose severe security risks, fix-
ing them does not have to be expensive. We believe that the flaws can be avoided in
the design phase if software developers possess secure development methods and tools.
This thesis will introduce new security improvement tools to improve current software
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security practice. The following hypothesis is stated:
Including security improvement tools and methods in early software de-
velopment lifecycle phases will contribute to development of more secure
software by mitigation of vulnerabilities during design, increasing software
security awareness and bridging the software security knowledge gap.
The research objectives (RO) of this thesis are described in Table 6.1.
RO1 Develop a security modelling tool that enables software security experts and
practitioners to create models of software security vulnerabilities and counter-
measures.
RO2 Develop software design tool artefacts that provide reusable security expert
knowledge in a format that is applicable at development time. This tool should
apply the output of the tool described in RO1 to guide design of vulnerability
countermeasures in software.
RO3 Document the tools as a proof of concept and evaluate contributions by per-
forming a case study of the tools in objectives 1-2.
Table 6.1: Research Objectives
It is hypothesised that the use of these tools will contribute to development of more
secure software by systematic prevention of software vulnerabilities. A security mod-
elling tool is expected to increase security awareness by making security a part of early
software development stages and supporting the identification process of vulnerability
countermeasures. A design tool supporting security will bridge the gap between secu-
rity professionals and software developers. The use of these tools in combination should
contribute to assure that the designed software countermeasures possible vulnerabili-
ties.
Note that measuring the assurance given by performing security modelling is without
scope of this work. This work is focused on the benefits of tool support to increase
awareness and accessibility of security knowledge.
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6.2 Research Process
This thesis is an extension of previous work by the author (13). Figure 6.1 shows an
activity diagram of the research process. The Prerequisite Work phase provides the
basis for the research to be performed and contains the previous work and a prelim-
inary study. A hypothesis is stated after the prerequisite work is completed. The
implementation phase will develop a security modelling tool as described in research
objective 1. Along with the implementation, a model describing how the modelling tool
can be combined with software design tool artefacts such as security pattern templates
will be defined. The implementation is followed by a case study which is designed to
document the use cases of the implemented tools, and ultimately describe how security
can be incorporated in early stages of a software development lifecycle. The case study
functions as a tool supported secure development proof of concept. The hypothesis is
finally evaluated by a qualitative discussion. This is a notable limitation of the research
process, which is necessary to limit the scope. The chosen research process will not be
able to quantify the achieved results and effects of made contributions. Validation is
made subject to further work.
6.3 Work Plan
Table 6.2 shows a work plan with milestone activities, a workload estimate in number of
weeks and percentages of total workload, and activity documentation references. The
plan is used to implement the research process by guiding the work and limiting scope.
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Hypothesis
Implementation
Case Study
Evaluation
Prerequisite Work
Figure 6.1: Research Method - Activity diagram
Activity Estimate Reference
Review previous work 0.5 2.5% Found in (13)
Problem description 1 5% Chapter 1
Preliminary study 6 30% Chapter 2 through 5
Summary of previous work and need of fur-
ther research
0.5 2.5% Section 4.1.1
Define hypothesis and research process 1 5% Chapter 6
Define tools context of use and requirements 1 5% Chapter 7, Section 9.2
Implementation 4 20% Chapter 9
Case study 2 10% Chapter 10
Evaluation of method and results 2 10% Chapter 11
Concluson and further work 2 10% Chapter 12
Total 20 100%
Table 6.2: Work Plan
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Using a Countermeasure Model
During Development
This chapter gives a high-level description of suggested security improvement methods
and tools of this thesis. The approach is based on applying security modelling to identify
possible weaknesses in early software development artefacts, which may lead to security
vulnerabilities. The output of the security modelling is used to apply countermeasures
in software design. Countermeasure modelling is introduced as a model to describe
vulnerabilities, countermeasures and their relations. This thesis will use the suggested
approach to identify suited security design patterns.
7.1 Approach and Countermeasure Modelling
The need to incorporate security throughout the software development lifecycle (SDL)
has been identified to improve software security practice in general. This thesis seeks
to do this by providing methods and tools that enable developers to apply security
information and knowledge during development. Specifically, the goal is to avoid and
mitigate possible software vulnerabilities early in the development lifecycle. Developers
should have a sense of assurance that they have implemented countermeasures that
target the right issues.
This thesis suggests a process to fill the security void early in the SDL. There exist
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methods to analyse and handle security in specification and design phases, e.g. ar-
chitectural risk analysis, security requirements, abuse cases etc. The output of these
activities is to a lesser extent used in software development to produce more secure
software. There is a lack of tools and integration between these security improvement
activities and software development activities, creating a gap between security exper-
tise and secure software development practice. We need methods and tools to integrate
security improvement activities throughout the SDL.
The approach in this work is based on a simple model shown in Figure 7.1. Security
experts compile security knowledge in various formats to be shared in some repository.
Software development tools with security improvement features are developed to make
use of the repository, helping developers to create more secure software.
Shared Security Knowledge
Security Experts
Developers
Development and 
security tools
Figure 7.1: Security Knowledge Tools Approach - Security knowledge and tools
at development time
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The model defined in Figure 7.1 is a general architecture that can be used for a wide
range of security knowledge formats and tools. The focus of this work is to identify
and mitigate software vulnerabilities. The approach is based on tool supported security
modelling of possible vulnerabilities and countermeasures and applying the output of
the modelling during software design. Figure 7.2 visualises this approach as an add-
on to a simple development lifecycle which resembles the classic Waterfall model (87).
Although this figure shows a sequential process, the approach is suited for an iterative
development process as well. After requirements are specified, security modelling is
performed to gain an understanding of possible security issues with the software to be
built. The security modelling activity takes requirements and possibly design docu-
ments as input, as shown by the backwards arrow from Design to Security Modelling.
The security modelling identifies potential vulnerabilities, threats and countermeasures.
The countermeasures are used in the design phase to prevent security problems.
Security Modelling
Requirements ImplementationDesign Test
Countermeasures
Operation
Figure 7.2: Software Development Lifecycle With Security Modelling - The
chosen approach incorporates security modelling in the SDL
The Security Modelling activity in Figure 7.2 produces output which is based on coun-
termeasure modelling; a modelling activity which seeks to analyse software artefacts
to identify possible vulnerabilities and determine suited countermeasures. Figure 7.3
shows a meta-model describing countermeasure modelling concepts and relations. The
Vulnerability class describes a software vulnerability; a flaw or weakness in a software
artefact that could be exploited. A vulnerability can be a class of vulnerabilities describ-
ing a group of similar vulnerabilities that stem from the same type of flaw or weakness,
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or a specific instance. A vulnerability is described in a VulnerabilityModel which is made
to understand the vulnerability, i.e. what are the causes and how this vulnerability is
instantiated in this specific instance. A VulnerabilityModel is realised by a vulnerabil-
ity cause graph. The VulnerabilityModel is related to a CountermeasureModel which
describes how the vulnerability can be avoided or mitigated. A CountermeasureModel
is realised by a security activity graph. The VulnerabilityModel and Countermeasure-
Model classes can both be decomposed, as shown by the ’part of’-relation. There are
possibly several countermeasures that can be combined to make a Countermeasure-
Model, these are defined as CountermeasureItems. A CountermeasureItem is a security
improvement strategy, activity or artefact such as the touchpoints described in Section
2.3 or countermeasures in Chapter 4. A CountermeasureItem is further divided into a
ToolItem or a DocumentItem. ToolItems are used by tools, examples are static analysis
rules, test configurations and design templates. DocumentItems are used by humans,
examples are: security requirements, checklists and inspection techniques. Counter-
measure modelling is performed by using security modelling techniques to map these
meta-modelling concepts to instances in the software being analysed.
7.2 Using Security Design Patterns
This thesis focuses on security design patterns as the countermeasure and limits the
scope of CountermeasureItems to security pattern templates as described in (13). Se-
curity patterns are made available to developers through security pattern design tem-
plates, countermeasure modelling is meant to help developers identify and apply the
right pattern before a flaw is instantiated in software design. The suggested approach
with tool support is designed to provide coupling between security expertise and devel-
opment practice as described in Figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.3: Countermeasure Modelling Domain Model - Concepts of counter-
measure modelling (Use of this model is permitted by SINTEF)
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Chapter 8
Extending Seamonster
SeaMonster (61) is an open source security modelling tool developed by students at
NTNU for SINTEF through a software development project. SeaMonster is designed
to help security experts and software developers model security through any phase
of software development. This chapter describes the current status of SeaMonster;
functionality and technical details. Possible further development is suggested. The
chapter serves as an examination of SeaMonster as a baseline for the countermeasure
modelling tool needed in the thesis.
8.1 Current Status
SeaMonster allows users to model threats, attacks and vulnerabilities in different di-
agram notations and tie the diagrams together in one security model. This security
model is used to summarise a set of diagrams aimed at describing different views of a
particular software security issue. The currently implemented modelling techniques are
attack trees, vulnerability cause graphs and misuse cases. These were described in Sec-
tion 3.2. Figure 8.1 shows a screenshot from SeaMonster. The centre frame shows the
current model, in this case a security model diagram consisting of three sub diagrams:
an AT, a VCG and a misuse case. These are connected together showing that there
is a relationship between the models, i.e. the vulnerabilities can be exploited trough
attacks, and the attacks can be performed in the misuse cases. The user interface is
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based on a palette of modelling components, which is different for each type of dia-
gram. Component properties such as descriptions or implementation cost can be used
to further detail the components. These properties are mainly limited to textual names
and descriptions so far.
Figure 8.1: SeaMonster Overview - Security model diagram
SeaMonster is distributed as open source and is therefore free to use and modify. It is
built using the Eclipse Graphical Modeling Framework (GMF) (19) which to a large
degree defines the system architecture. A thorough understanding of this framework
and its dependencies is needed to further develop and improve SeaMonster.
The Eclipse (21) platform is an open source development platform comprised of extensi-
ble frameworks and tools. GMF is a framework for developing Eclipse graphical editors,
and functions as a bridge between the Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF) (20) and
Graphical Editing Framework (GEF) (18). The relations between these frameworks
are described in Figure 8.2. EMF is a modelling and code generation framework for
building applications based on a structured data model, often referred to as a domain
model. GEF is a framework that takes an existing application data model and cre-
ates a graphical editor for this model. It provides layout and rendering for displaying
74
8.1 Current Status
graphics.
GMF-developed Graphical Editor
Eclipse Modeling 
Framework
Eclipse Platform
Eclipse Modeling 
Framework
Eclipse Modeling 
Framework
uses
uses
uses
uses
uses
uses uses
uses uses
Figure 8.2: GMF Dependencies - Eclipse frameworks relations
GMF-based development
Figure 8.3 shows an overview of the GMF development process and models used during
development. The domain model, graphical definition and tooling definition can be
developed in arbitrary order; an intuitive approach might however assume the domain
model is developed first. The domain model defines the structure of the application
data and can be modelled using a UML (31) modelling tool. The structure defines data,
their attributes and relations. The graphical definition model is central to GMF and
contains the graphical elements that are to appear in the final editor. Shapes, colours,
labels etc. can be defined here. The optional tooling definition model specifies a palette
and other periphery such as menus and toolbars. These tools are used to create diagram
components. Once the above definition models are created, a mapping model is used
to link the graphical and tooling definitions to the domain model(s). The mapping
of definitions enables reuse of components, i.e. a graphical or tooling definition may
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work well for several domain models. The mapping model defines what parts of the
data model are to be included as components in the diagram. Each component has a
graphical representation from the graphical definition and optionally a tool such as a
creation tool. Finally, a generator model specifies implementation details for the code
generation. This includes packaging properties, application settings and more. Once
the generator model is defined, the graphical editor can be generated. The resulting
application code is a working graphical editor for the domain model. To add a feature
not supported by the Eclipse modelling frameworks, it is possible to apply any wanted
changes to the code.
EMF Model 
Description 
(domain model)
GMF Tooling 
Definiton
GMF Graphical 
Definition
GMF Mapping 
Model
Create GMF 
project
Generate 
Diagram Plug-in
GMF Generator 
Model
Figure 8.3: GMF Overview - basic development process
SeaMonster models and GMF components
The concepts to be modelled in a GMF-based editor must be included in the domain
model. In the case of SeaMonster, any concept used in the security modelling ap-
proaches must be included in the domain model. Figure 8.4 shows a high-level class
diagram of the domain model.
The SecurityModel class represents the high-level security model which ties together
diagrams of different modelling approaches. The SecurityModel may contain one or
more sub diagrams of the types VCG, AttackTree or MisUseCase. These define the
modelling approaches available in the editor. The extentions of SubDiagram are reduced
to single classes in the figure to increase readability. To expand SeaMonster with
other modelling approaches, the domain model has to be expanded by creating a new
extension of SubDiagram. The class VCG is expanded in Figure 8.5.
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Figure 8.4: SeaMonster Domain Model - Class diagram of the domain model
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Figure 8.5: VCG Data Definition Model - Vulnerability cause graphs defined in
the domain model
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Refer to Section 3.2.4 for a detailed explanation of vulnerability cause graphs. The data
definition of a VCG is the most complex of the diagrams because of numerous relations
including constraints between components. VCG nodes are divided into ExitNodes and
CauseNodes. An ExitNode represents the vulnerability described by the graph, and
there is only one of them in each graph. All other nodes are a subtype of CauseNode.
The CauseNode is subtyped by three classes; SimpleNode, CompoundNode and Con-
junctionNode. The difference between the first two is the visual representation. The
ConjunctionNode differs from the other two in that it is a container component and
therefore can contain other CauseNodes. Some classes are given attributes, e.g. name,
description and CVElink. These can be used to describe diagram components or en-
able graph computations in the resulting editor. The CVElink attribute is currently not
implemented in SeaMonster, but it is designed to link modelled vulnerabilities to vul-
nerability repositories such as CVE (58). The AttackTree and MisUseCase definitions
are fairly similar to the VCG definition and are left out here.
The GMF graphical definitions define the diagram notations. There is a variety of
predefined symbols and external images can be utilised. The technical details of the
graphical, tooling and mapping definition will not be explained here because they are
rather straightforward with respect to GMF-development.
Components and deployment
SeaMonster is arranged as a set of plug-ins running on the Eclipse platform. Each
type of diagram is implemented as a plug-in to improve modularity and extendibility.
SeaMonster consists of the following plug-ins:
• seaMonster: contains the domain objects.
• seaMonster.edit: contains the domain objects.
• seaMonster.secmod: contains the security model diagram code. This plug-in also
defines the SeaMonster application startup.
• seaMonster.attackTree: contains the attack tree diagram code.
• seaMonster.vcg: contains the vulnerability cause graph diagram code.
• seaMonster.misuseCase: contains the misuse case diagram code.
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The implementation of SeaMonster is highly modular due to the plug-in structure. A
plug-in can be added or removed independent of other components.
8.2 Possible Further Development
The design of SeaMonster using independent plug-ins and choice of implementation
technology (Eclipse frameworks) make it highly modular. For instance, a goal of GMF
is to allow the graphical definition to be reused for several domains. This is possible
by using a separate mapping model to link the graphical and tooling definitions to a
domain model. The technical feasibility of improving and extending SeaMonster is not
an issue.
A quick study of SeaMonster is performed to identify possible improvements that will
contribute to the research in this thesis. These are described in the following para-
graphs.
Adding other modelling techniques. SeaMonster currently includes attack trees,
vulnerability cause graphs and misuse case diagrams. Adding support for other secu-
rity modelling types and security diagrams would increase the degree of completeness
with respect to security modelling. The modelling of countermeasures is not strongly
supported. Identifying countermeasures during development is central to this thesis,
implementing some countermeasure modelling technique is very relevant and feasible.
Security activity graphs are a viable option.
Tighter coupling between diagrams. A security diagram currently connects dif-
ferent security diagrams in SeaMonster. This diagram gives a high-level overview of
a security model with single nodes representing a diagram and connections describing
their relations. The relations are simple links and do not provide any functionality
except describing that there is a relationship between to diagrams. For instance, the
goal of an attack tree exploits the vulnerability of a vulnerability cause graph. Im-
provements of the links between diagrams could include navigation between diagrams
by clicking in the high-level security model.
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Diagram decomposition. Security models can be large and complex. Implementing
a diagram decomposition mechanism would increase usability and enable security mod-
elling at different abstraction levels. This would enable (different) users to model with
a choice of granularity, e.g. security experts might provide more detailed knowledge
than developers who are not trained in software security.
Model calculations. Some modelling techniques are suited for model calculations.
The cost of performing an attack can be calculated in attack trees if each node is
described with a cost metric. Model calculations can be useful in a risk management
process, i.e. for prioritising and ordering schemes.
Preferred paths. Security modelling techniques often describe several options to
threat, attack or counter attacks. For instance, there are several ways to achieve unau-
thorised access: using a backdoor entry point, guessing or brute-forcing a password.
Highlighting parts of a security model can be used to describe preferred solutions, most
likely attack etc. This can currently be done by using appearance properties such as
node colour, but creating tools for this is better for usability.
Resolved nodes. Marking a node as ’Resolved’ is useful in tracking security issues.
This requires additional diagram tools.
Model validation. Modelling techniques have constraints on diagram components
(nodes and connections). Model validation ensures that all constraints are followed in
models created in the editor.
Use of external knowledge repositories Chapter 5 described mechanisms for
sharing security knowledge through tools. Use of external vulnerability repositories is
a possible improvement. The repositories can be used to pull information on common
vulnerabilities that are modelled in a SeaMonster diagram.
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Standard model format and diagram interchange Following a standard format
for diagram export could enable easier diagram interchange between SeaMonster and
other modelling tools. The UML meta-model is a possible candidate.
Decisions regarding further development are made in Chapter 9.
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Realisation
This chapter describes the realisation of the security improvement tool suggested in this
thesis. A security modelling tool for modelling of vulnerabilities and countermeasures
is defined through 22 requirements. The tool design and implementation is based on
extending SeaMonster (61).
9.1 Realisation Description
Chapter 7 described an approach based on countermeasure modelling and sharing se-
curity knowledge between security experts and software developers through security
improvement tools. A security modelling tool for modelling of software vulnerabili-
ties and countermeasures (Research Objective 1) will be implemented to be used in
combination with software design tool artefacts (Research Objective 2) as shown in
Figure 9.1. Security experts and practitioners perform countermeasure modelling in
the security modelling tool. A complete realisation would store the security models
in a security knowledge repository which could then be utilised from the software de-
sign tool. In the following realisation, the repository will be short-circuited to limit
implementation workload. The countermeasure models will not be accessible outside
the security modelling tool because of the short-circuit, this is however a small tech-
nical limitation that does not affect the contribution of the countermeasure modelling
process. Software developers use the countermeasure models to find the right security
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Countermeasure Models
Security Experts:
Model definition
Software Developers:
Using models to find security patterns
Security Knowledge Repository
Figure 9.1: Realisation - The repository is short-circuited
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pattern design templates.
The security pattern design templates are developed in previous work (13), the coming
sections describe the realisation of the security modelling tool.
9.2 Requirements
Security is not yet an established niche in the commercial software modelling industry.
It is therefore unfeasible to base the requirements of a security modelling tool on pre-
vious solutions. The author has created a list of requirements which are inspired by
existing general-purpose modelling and design tools.
The following are suggested requirements for a graphical editor specialised for software
security modelling:
1. There must be a canvas that expands as the user builds models exceeding the
current modelling area.
2. There must be a tool palette from which the user can select between a predefined
set of tools and modelling components.
3. The tool palette must be configured to the type of security diagram currently
being modelled.
4. An unlimited number of predefined components can be added to the canvas.
5. There must be zoom in and zoom out functionality.
6. It must be possible to have several diagrams loaded simultaneously.
7. There must be a model selection pane to switch between the currently loaded
diagrams.
8. Textual notes can be placed anywhere on the canvas. These are independent of
the modelling components.
9. There must be a mechanism for highlighting parts of a diagram.
10. The editor must include an undo-operation that cancels the last operation.
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11. The editor must include a cut-operation that removes the selected item(s).
12. The editor must include a copy-operation that copies the selected item(s).
13. The editor must include a clipboard and a paste-operation that pastes modelling
components currently on the clipboard.
14. The editor must support modelling of software vulnerabilities through vulnera-
bility cause graphs.
15. The editor must support modelling of vulnerability countermeasures through se-
curity activity graphs.
16. Modelling components must have the following textual properties: name and
description.
17. The editor must support model decomposition.
18. The notation used in vulnerability cause graphs must follow the one used in (15).
19. The notation used in security activity graphs must follow the one used in (7).
20. It must be possible to save diagrams to file.
21. It must be possible to open diagram from file.
22. It must be possible to generate security activity graphs automatically from pre-
defined vulnerability causes.
9.3 SeaMonster
SeaMonster will be used as a baseline for the described security modelling tool. Sea-
Monster was described and briefly evaluated for further development in Chapter 8.
The decision to use SeaMonster is based on three aspects: fulfilment of requirements,
technical feasibility of further development and potential for further development.
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Fulfilment of requirements. SeaMonster fulfils the majority of requirements de-
fined in the previous section so it is aligned with the security modelling tool described
in this thesis. Table 9.1 shows a summary of an evaluation of fulfilled requirements in
SeaMonster. Using SeaMonster as a baseline for the security modelling tool will relieve
the workload and possibly improve the contributions of the thesis.
Requirement Fulfilled Comment
1 OK The canvas can expand in all directions.
2 OK
3 OK
4 OK
5 OK
6 OK
7 OK
8 OK
9 OK Diagram components can be highlighted using a colour
palette in the appearance properties.
10 OK
11 OK
12 OK
13 OK
14 OK
15 N/A Security activity graphs are not supported.
16 OK
17 N/A No decomposition mechanism exists.
18 OK
19 N/A Security activity graphs are not supported.
20 OK
21 OK
22 N/A Security activity graphs are not supported.
Table 9.1: Requirements Fulfilled in SeaMonster
Technical feasibility. This refers to the feasibility of extending the SeaMonster im-
plementation artefacts. SeaMonster has a highly modular design with one plug-in for
every type of modelling diagram. This enables maintainability because changes in one
plug-in will usually not introduce changes to other plug-ins. GMF-development is well
documented through online tutorials and examples (19). The Eclipse platform pro-
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vides model editors for GMF-artefacts, which should make it easier to understand the
existing SeaMonster implementation artefacts.
Potential for further development. Some possible directions for further develop-
ment were described in Section 8.2. This shows that SeaMonster has potential as a
thorough security modelling tool. Requirements 15, 17 and 19 should be implemented
as a contribution of this thesis.
9.4 Design
SeaMonster is developed using Eclipse Graphical Modeling Framework (GMF) which
was described in Chapter 8. The architecture of SeaMonster is to a large degree defined
by GMF and will remain unmodified. Some design modifications and additions are done
in the data model and composition of system modules.
Figure 9.2 shows the system modules after adding the package seaMonster.sag. The
packages seaMonster and seaMonster.edit contain the domain model, i.e. Java classes
describing the security concepts to be modelled in the diagrams. These packages are
used by the five packages defining one security diagram each. Adding security activity
graphs in SeaMonster is done by implementing the package seaMonster.sag.
The domain model is expanded to define security activity graphs (SAG). The extension
is designed to include SAGs in the security model diagram as is already done with at-
tack trees, vulnerability cause graphs and misuse cases. Figure 9.3 shows the modified
domain model of SeaMonster. The domain model is a data definition model describing
concepts and relations to be modelled in the editor. The SecurityModel class repre-
sents the high-level security model which ties together diagrams of different modelling
approaches. The SecurityModel may contain one or more sub diagrams of the types
VCG, AttackTree, MisUseCase or the added SAG. These types define the modelling
approaches available in the editor. The extensions of SubDiagram are reduced to single
classes in the figure to increase readability. The class SAG is shown in full-scale in
Figure 9.4. A SAG diagram contains one Vulnerability which has a name and a de-
scription. A vulnerability has one predecessor node, a SAGNode, as its root activity.
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seaMonster
seaMonster.edit
seaMonster.secmod
seaMonster.misuseCase
seaMonster.attackTree
seaMonster.vcg
seaMonster.sag
Figure 9.2: SeaMonster Plug-ins Extended - SeaMonster.sag implements security
activity graphs
89
9. REALISATION
The root activity can be any node allowed in a SAG; or, and, split or activity. These
nodes are represented by their respective classes in the figure.
Figure 9.3: Extended SeaMonster Domain Model - SAG is added as a type of
diagram
A SAG is a directed acyclic graph which means that no relation between modelling
components in the graph should introduce a cycle. A cycle detection algorithm is used
to detect possible cycles and should be applied each time a relation is created. The
algorithm takes two nodes as parameters and returns true if a relation between the
nodes does not introduce a cycle, and false if it does. The algorithm is the same as the
one used in the existing attack tree plug-in. Pseudo-code is given below.
cycleDetection(nodeA, nodeB){
X <- nodeB;
while X not empty:
Y <- remove first element of X
90
9.4 Design
Figure 9.4: SAG Data Definition Model - SAG defined in the domain model
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if Y = nodeA:
return false;
add all predecessors of Y to X
return true;
}
9.5 Implementation
This section describes the modification of existing SeaMonster plug-ins and the im-
plementation of a new plug-in for security activity graphs. The details in this section
require knowledge of GMF which was introduced in Chapter 8. GMF generates Java
code from a set of GMF models. This set contains these files that need to be created
or modified:
• seaMonster.ecore. This is the EMF data definition model.
• *.gmfgraph. The GMF graphical definition model defines the graphical elements
of the editor.
• *.gmftool. The GMF tooling definition model defines the available tools.
• *.gmfmap. The GMF mapping model relates the data definition, graphical ele-
ments and tools.
• *.gmfgen. The GMF generator model defines the code generation process. Ex-
ample variables are package names and structures, copyright information and file
extensions.
9.5.1 Security Activity Graph Plug-in
The SeaMonster data definition model (seaMonster.ecore) is updated to include secu-
rity activity graphs as shown in Figure 9.3 and 9.4 in Section 9.4. It is modified using
the UML based built-in Eclipse EMF editor. The packages seaMonster and seaMon-
ster.edit were regenerated to reflect the changes in the data definition model. The
security model in SeaMonster is a diagram that connects different security diagrams in
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a high-level perspective. This diagram is defined in the plug-in seaMonster.secmod and
is modified to include security activity graphs. This required changes to the graphical,
tooling and mapping model. Security activity graphs are implemented in the plug-in
seaMonster.sag. The following paragraphs describe the steps involved in the implemen-
tation:
Graphical definition
The graphical definition which defines the visual appearance and properties of the dia-
gram is shown in Figure 9.5. Modelling components that are to appear in the diagram
are defined as Nodes. Connections between nodes are defined as Connections. Figure
Descriptors are created to define the visual representation of nodes and connections.
The Diagram Labels define node labels, allow modelling components to have short
names or descriptions. The nodes in the graphical definition follow the SAG syntax
described in Section 3.2.5.
Tooling definition
The tooling definition which defines the tool palette is shown in Figure 9.6. The model
defines six tools, one for the creation of each SAG element. The tool icons are set as
bundled images. These images are also used on diagram elements to follow the specified
modelling syntax.
Mapping definition
The mapping definition is shown in Figure 9.7. This model defines a mapping between
the data definition, graphical and tooling models. A Top Node Reference is created for
any modelling component that can be placed directly on the modelling canvas,e.g. the
first element in the diagram or elements not connected to any other elements. This is
created for a vulnerability, activity, and-node, or-node and split-node. Each top node
is given a Feature Label Mapping which maps the name attribute of each class specified
in the data definition to the node. The Link Mappings relate the connections from
the graphical definition to tools from the tooling definition and target nodes. One of
the link mappings is given a Link Constraint which is set to be implemented in the
generated Java code. This constraint contains the cycle detection algorithm. The code
generation framework creates a code skeleton which has to be implemented by the
developer.
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Figure 9.5: SAG Graphical Definition Model -
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Figure 9.6: SAG Tooling Definition Model -
Figure 9.7: SAG Mapping Definition Model -
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Modifications to generated code
The cycle prevention algorithm specified in Section 9.4 was implemented in SeaMon-
sterBaseItemSemanticEditPolicy.java found in the sag.diagram.edit.policies package.
The method preActivityConstraint implements the link constraint of the LinkMap-
ping(SAGNode/ActivityNodePredecessor) from the mapping definition model. This
modification is made to adhere to the SAG syntax and to enable further work with
model computations. The constructors of the classes SAGAndNodeEditPart.java, OrN-
odeEditPart.java and SplitNodeEditPart.java in the sag.diagram.edit.parts package
were modified to use a CenterStackLayout. This change puts the diagram node la-
bels to the centre of the node.
The product configuration was modified to add plug-in dependency of the new plug-in.
9.6 Testing
The testing of SeaMonster with a security activity graph plug-in is performed as an
internal quality assurance. The goal is to identify possible discrepancies between re-
quirements and implementation, to discover and being able to correct errors and flaws.
The testing is meant to document that the application is suited for a case study and
thereby assuring the value in made contributions. The tests are simple functional tests
that can be mapped to the requirements in Section 9.2. Detected errors are corrected
unless otherwise is stated. The test suite contains 13 tests and is described in Tables
9.2 through 9.14.
Table 9.2: Test 1
Test ID 1
Test name Canvas
Requirements 1, 4
Test description Expected Result Result
Build an arbitrary diagram. Extend
the diagram with a new component
that stretches outside the current can-
vas. Repeat the last step placing a
component above, under, left and right
of the initial diagram.
The canvas expands in the di-
rection specified by the user.
Approved
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Build an arbitrary diagram with 20
components and 20 connections.
The components are placed in
the diagram without any in-
terruptions or degrade of per-
formance.
Approved
Table 9.3: Test 2
Test ID 2
Test name Palette
Requirements 2, 3
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a security activity graph dia-
gram. Use the tool palette to create
the following modelling components:
vulnerability, and-node, or-node, split-
node and activity. Draw a connection
between the vulnerability and the ac-
tivity.
The tool palette is configured
for security activity graphs
with tools for the components
described in the test descrip-
tion. The tools can be used to
create the mentioned compo-
nents and connections.
Approved
Create a vulnerability cause graph di-
agram. Select the ExitNode creation
tool from the palette and create the
node.
The tool palette switches
to vulnerability cause graph
mode. An exit node is cre-
ated.
Approved
Table 9.4: Test 3
Test ID 3
Test name Notes
Requirements 8
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a security activity graph dia-
gram with a vulnerability. Create a
note which is not connected to the vul-
nerability and give it the text ’this is a
test’. Delete the vulnerability.
A note is created with the
specified text. The note re-
mains when the vulnerability
is deleted.
Approved
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Table 9.5: Test 4
Test ID 4
Test name Highlighting
Requirements 9
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a security activity graph dia-
gram with a vulnerability connected to
an or-node which is then connected to
two activities. Give one activity and
the or-node a background colour differ-
ent from the vulnerability.
The specified diagram is se-
lected and specified nodes are
given a background colour.
Approved
Table 9.6: Test 5
Test ID 5
Test name GUI
Requirements 5, 6, 7
Test description Expected Result Result
Create an arbitrary diagram. Zoom in
so one modelling component covers the
canvas. Zoom out until the complete
diagram fits the canvas.
Zooming functionality should
behave as specified in the test
description.
Approved
Create a vulnerability cause graph, se-
curity activity graph and an attack
tree.
The different diagrams should
be created without closing the
other diagram(s).
Approved
Continue from the above step. Switch
between the diagrams using the dia-
gram selection pane.
SeaMonster shall switch
between the diagrams and
change the user interface
accordingly.
Approved
Table 9.7: Test 6
Test ID 6
Test name Standard editor functionality
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Requirements 10, 11, 12, 13
Test description Expected Result Result
Create an arbitrary diagram with 4
components.
Create a connection between two com-
ponents. Undo the operation from the
Edit menu.
The connection is undone. Approved
Create a connection between two com-
ponents. Select the connection and cut
it using the Edit menu.
The connection is cut from the
diagram.
Approved
Select a component and copy it using
the Edit menu. Paste the copy into the
diagram using the Edit menu
The component is copied and
pasted into the diagram.
Approved
Table 9.8: Test 7
Test ID 7
Test name Vulnerability Cause Graphs
Requirements 14, 18
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a vulnerability cause graph dia-
gram.
All components of a vulnera-
bility cause graph is available
in the palette.
Approved
Create the diagram shown in Figure
9.8.
The diagram should be cre-
ated without errors and with
matching notation.
Approved
Table 9.9: Test 8
Test ID 8
Test name Security Activity Graphs
Requirements 15, 19
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a security activity graph dia-
gram.
All components of a security
activity graph is available in
the palette.
Approved
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Create the diagram shown in Figure
9.9.
The diagram should be cre-
ated without errors and with
matching notation.
Approved
Table 9.10: Test 9
Test ID 9
Test name Decomposition
Requirements 17
Test description Expected Result Result
Create an arbitrary diagram with at
least one modelling component. Se-
lect a component, click it with the right
mouse button and decompose it.
The component should be de-
composed by initiating a di-
alogue where a new diagram
can be instantiated. The
new diagram is connected to
the originial component and
can be accessed by double-
clicking.
Failed
Table 9.11: Test 10
Test ID 10
Test name Properties
Requirements 16
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a security activity graph dia-
gram with one component of each type
from the palette. Edit properties and
give them a name and description
The properties are be stored
with the component.
Approved
Table 9.12: Test 11
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Test ID 11
Test name Persistence
Requirements 16
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a security activity graph dia-
gram. Save the diagram to file, close
and restart SeaMonster. Open the
saved model.
The diagram should be saved
to the specified path. The dia-
gram should look the same af-
ter SeaMonster has restarted.
Approved
Table 9.13: Test 12
Test ID 12
Test name Cycle prevention
Requirements N/A
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a security activity graph dia-
gram. Create three and-nodes and con-
nect them in a circular manner.
The third connection complet-
ing the cycle should not be al-
lowed.
Approved
Table 9.14: Test 13
Test ID 13
Test name SAG generation
Requirements 22
Test description Expected Result Result
Create a vulnerability cause graph with
a minimum of 3 causes. Highlight the
complete graph and generate a security
activity graph.
The generated SAG should be
composed following the algo-
rithm in (6).
Failed
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Figure 9.8: Vulnerability Cause Graph Test -
Figure 9.9: Security Activity Graph Test -
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9.6.1 Test Summary
All tests were approved except Test 9 (Decomposition) and Test 13 (SAG Generation).
Model decomposition and SAG generation is not implemented due to time constraints,
therefore requirement 17 and 22 will not be fulfilled during this thesis. This is not
viewed as a severe shortcoming of the implementation because this functionality is not
essential to the research objectives and the countermeasure modelling approach. Model
decomposition was stated as a requirement because it was intended to improve usability
and readability of security model diagrams. Automatic generation of security activity
graphs is likely a useful tool, especially for users not trained in security or the use of
SAGs. The state of the implemented security modelling tool is satisfactory in regards
to performing a case study.
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Chapter 10
Case Study
This chapter contains a case study of the suggested security improvement method and
tools. The case study is performed to document and evaluate the contributions of
this thesis. A medical patient journal system is described as the case software system.
The system’s specifications are analysed through security modelling and vulnerability
countermeasures are applied in the system design.
10.1 Approach and Case Description
Research objective 3 is a case study designed to document the suggested security im-
provement approach and tools. The value of the case study is twofold; as a proof of
concept it shows how the contributions are applied and possible benefits. Second, the
case study enables an evaluation of the contributions through experiences with apply-
ing them. The case study will demonstrate how security improvement tools can be
applied in early stages of the software development lifecycle. The approach is based
on an analysis of system specifications and designs, followed by mitigation of software
vulnerabilities in the design phase.
The case study should deal with software and security risks that are relevant to the
current trends in software and security. Increasing connectivity has a large influence
on security issues. Systems connected to the Internet are vulnerable to software-based
attacks, because the growing connectivity of computers increase the number of attack
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vectors and decreases the level of sophistication that is needed to perform an attack
(46). The Web is a special case of the client-server model, which introduces the concept
of a user not trusted by the system. Deploying an application on a Web server intro-
duces security risks which should be considered during design. The software described
in the case study will therefore be specified as a Web application. Security becomes
increasingly important as software handles valuable or confidential assets. The soft-
ware described in the case study should have strict requirements to confidentiality and
integrity of information.
Following the above guidelines, a system for administration of medical patient journals
is chosen for the case study. The system should be available through a Web interface.
Figure 10.1 shows a UML use case diagram of the system. The diagram describes
interactions between users and the system. The system has several types of users
which should have access to different functions and information. Medical staff is able
to write diagnoses and comments to a patient profile. Patients use the system to view
diagnoses and personal information stored in the system. The system administrator
has access to all functions.
System requirements are made to define assets and security objectives. These require-
ments are created by the author solely for this case study and are not complete for a
real medical information system. The system has the following requirements:
1. There are five actors in the system: patients, system administrator, medical staff,
doctors and nurses. Medical staff includes doctors and nurses.
2. Each patient has a medical journal which includes the following: name, age,
address, phone number, social security number, diagnoses and medical comments
from doctors and nurses.
3. A patient should be able to view the personal information specified in Require-
ment 2 and the diagnosis linked to her.
4. Medical staff should be able to view any patient journal.
5. Doctors should be able to post comments to each patient’s journal. These are
only accessible by medical staff.
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Patient
System Administrator
Doctor Nurse
Log on
View Diagnose
Change Diagnose
Write Comment
View Nurse Comment
View Personal
Information
View Doctor Comment
Write Comment
View User
Figure 10.1: Case Study Use Cases - Connections from the System Administrator
to the use cases are left out to increase readability
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6. Nurses should be able to post comments to each patient’s journal. These are only
accessible by medical staff.
7. A system administrator should be able to view the names of all users of the
system.
8. A system administrator should have access to all system functions.
9. The system must perform access control to ensure that the specified information
are accessible only to those specified in these requirements.
10. The integrity of stored information must be ensured.
11. The system must be accessible through the Internet and a Web browser.
10.2 Analysis and Design
This section documents the case study execution and describes the produced artefacts.
The specified journal system is analysed using the approach in Chapter 7 and designed
using security pattern design templates.
Countermeasure modelling can be performed using only system specifications as input,
but is perhaps more valuable if design is included because this enables a deeper and
more specific analysis of possible threats and vulnerabilities. A high-level design and
system deployment is created before the countermeasure modelling is performed. Figure
10.2 shows a deployment diagram of the journal system. The system is deployed on
a Web server and accessed using a Web browser. The user interfaces are built using
Java servlets (56) which can generate a dynamic response with Web-content based on
a request. The servlets get their data from a data package which is responsible for
communicating with the underlying database.
Figure 10.3 shows a high-level design with the main modules of the journal system. The
Client package represents the client-side (Generated HTML pages and a Web browser).
The Container class is a Web container which is a specialised Web server that supports
servlet execution. All requests to the system are handled by this component.. The
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Web Server
Database Server
Client Web 
Browser
data
servlets
Figure 10.2: Case Deployment - The journal system is deployed on a Web server
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Figure 10.3: High-Level Design I - Module structure
servlets package holds the business logic of the application and communicates with the
data package which provides persistence.
Figure 10.4 shows a design of the data package. This model does not support access
rights, and would leave access control to the implementations of higher application
layers.
Figure 10.4: High-Level Design II - Data layer
The medical journal system is specified to deal with a large number of users and informa-
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tion resources. So far the design is made without much effort in security. Implementing
and deploying this design is likely to produce a very insecure software system.
10.2.1 Countermeasure Modelling
Proper countermeasure modelling requires security knowledge and experiences with
security risks, attack patterns and common vulnerabilities and should therefore be per-
formed by security experts and professionals. The system specifications and design
are analysed, potential vulnerabilities and countermeasures are modelled using the ex-
tended SeaMonster. The modelling performed in this case study includes only technical
vulnerabilities and causes because the scope of countermeasures is limited to those ap-
plicable during software design. Human factors are a big part of security risks (70)
and should be considered in a real-world scenario. Figure 10.5 shows a screenshot from
SeaMonster where a security activity graph diagram is created.
Figure 10.5: Extended SeaMonster Screenshot - Security Activity Graph Diagram
Medical records are highly sensitive data with strict privacy requirements. The dis-
closure of this information is a severe threat and should be counter measured during
design. The system specifications are analysed using knowledge on information disclo-
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sure issues and a vulnerability cause graph (VCG) is created as shown in Figure 10.6.
Figure 10.6: Case VCG I - Vulnerability: Information disclosure
These causes of possible information disclosure issues in the journal system are identi-
fied:
• Insecure communications. Requirements state that the information handled in
the system is highly sensitive and its privacy must be ensured. Failure to encrypt
communications means that an attacker who can sniff traffic from the network
will be able to access the communication payloads.
• Insecure storage. The healthcare records and personal information of system users
must be stored in a secure manner. The high-level designs do not specify any use
of cryptographic storage. Preventing cryptographic flaws takes careful planning
and must be included in design.
• Data model is not scalable. The system requirements state that the system must
handle a large number of users mapped to different acting roles with levels of
access rights. This is modeled as a conjunction of two causes in Figure 10.6. The
data layer design defines access rights per user, which is highly redundant and
error prone. Managing the rights per user account may not be feasible.
• Lack of access policy and control. A system of this size should have a centralised
mechanism which defines access policies and performs access control.
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A countermeasure model is now created for the information disclosure vulnerability. To
create a security activity graph (SAG) from the VCG, recall from Section 3.2.5 that
the first step is to enumerate mitigation techniques for each cause. The techniques are
expressed as logic combinations of concrete actions:
Insecure communications:
Vulnerability scanning tools can verify that SSL is used on the front end. Scanning tools
may not have access to check backend connections between infrastructure elements such
as between Web server and database server. The use of code review is efficient to verify
encryption on backend communications.
Graph fragment: (Vulnerability scanning tools AND Use SSL) AND (Encrypt commu-
nications between infrastructure elements AND Code review)
Insecure storage:
Sensitive data must be persisted using cryptographic storage. Failing to encrypt sen-
sitive data or using poorly designed cryptography can lead to information disclosure.
Verifying use of cryptographic storage should be done by a code review because scan-
ning tools can only detect use of cryptographic APIs, not verify that they are being
used properly.
Graph fragment: Code review AND Safe use of cryptography for storage of sensitive
information
Data model is not scalable:
Assigning rights to roles based on job functions is a way of supporting the least priv-
ilege principle (67). Creating the role abstraction removes the access rights definition
redundancy in the data model and ensures that users have the specified rights only.
Graph fragment: Role rights definition
Lack of access policy and control:
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) (71) is a security pattern that defines how access
rights are mapped to users via roles in an environment with a large number of users,
information sources and resources. The roles should be reflected in the data layer design
to enable a centralised access control mechanism. Any use of information resources
through the system should be verified by performing access control according to the
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roles.
Graph fragment: RBAC AND Centralised access control
Step 2 of the SAG generation process is to create graph fragments for each set of
mitigation techniques. This is straightforward when the sets are expressed in predicate
logic as done above. Finally, the fragments are combined to create the final graph. This
can be seen in Figure 10.7. Some post-generation simplification could result in a simpler
graph, e.g. reducing the number of AND-nodes, but the original graph preserves the
relationships between the activities. An example is the use of code review to check
the use of encryption of communications between infrastructure components. These
activities are highly connected.
Figure 10.7: Case SAG I - Vulnerability: Information disclosure
The assets of the journal system are healthcare records and personally identifiably
information. The integrity and confidentiality of this data must be ensured, as specified
by requirements. Tampering or disclosure of this information is a severe threat and
should be counter measured during design. Injection flaws enable attackers to create,
read, update, or delete data. The system specifications are analysed using knowledge
on injection flaws and a VCG is created as shown in Figure 10.8.
These causes of possible injection flaws in the journal system are identified:
• Unrestricted privileges. If user privileges are unrestricted, performing an injection
attack will enable attackers to perform a wide range of operations they are not
114
10.2 Analysis and Design
Figure 10.8: Case VCG II - Vulnerability: Injection flaws
meant to. Examples are file access, invoking sub-systems or system calls.
• Accepts malicious input. If the system accepts and trusts user-supplied data
as safe, attackers may inject commands to compromise the system and integrity
of stored information. Mitigating this is extremely important because there are
many entry points to the software through user-supplied input. This cause has
three underlying causes. Weak input restrictions enable attackers to supply input
that is out of valid range or of different data types. Lack of input validation
means the software accepts user-supplied data without verifying that it is safe.
Blacklist validation is a flawed validation technique that specifies and removes a
set of invalid character strings. It is not sufficient because it is difficult to cover
all possible malicious inputs.
• Output encoding. Unspecified or lacking output encoding enables command in-
jections to be run in browsers.
• Use of unsafe APIs and Detailed error messages. The use of unsafe Application
Programming Interfaces (API) in combination with giving too detailed error mes-
sages allows attackers to exploit known weaknesses in the system. Error messages
that reveal details of the system structure and technologies help attackers design
their attacks. Examples of use of unsafe APIs are unsafe character escaping func-
tions of database APIs.
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A countermeasure model is now created for the injection flaw vulnerability. Mitigation
techniques for each cause are enumerated:
Unrestricted privileges:
Two security patterns are used to restrict privileges; rights are defined using roles and
RBAC is used to implement the access control. This should keep attackers from being
able to perform system functions or access resources.
Graph fragment: Role rights definition AND RBAC
Accepts malicious input:
The security design pattern Intercepting Validator (78) is used to validate input. This
pattern defines a centralised and simple yet flexible solution to validate all data passed in
from the client. System designers should carefully define valid input ranges; data types,
bounds and formats, to be able to reject and accept user-supplied input. Whitelist val-
idation is a validation technique where input is filtered according to a set of rules that
define /textitvalid input. The alternative to whitelist validation is blacklist.
Graph fragment: Intercepting Validator AND Define input ranges AND Whitelist val-
idation
Output encoding:
Specifying and ensuring strong output encoding should be done to prevent a successful
script injection from running in the client browser. This activity is named output
encoding for brevity.
Graph fragment: Output encoding
Use of unsafe APIs and Detailed error messages:
Code review or static code analysis should be performed to detect use of unsafe APIs.
Any instances of unsafe code should be replaced with safe APIs.
Graph fragment: (Code review OR Static code analysis) AND Use of safe APIs
Step 2 of the SAG generation process is to create graph fragments for each set of
mitigation techniques. This is straightforward when the sets are expressed in predicate
logic as done above. The resulting graph can be seen in Figure 10.9. Some post-
generation simplification could result in a simpler graph, e.g. reducing the number of
AND-nodes, but the original graph preserves the relationships between the activities
better.
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Figure 10.9: Case SAG II - Vulnerability: Injection flaws
The two security activity graphs point to a set of activities which in a real-world
application should be implemented to mitigate security risk. Two activities will be
followed in this case study: RBAC from the Information Disclosure vulnerability and
Intercepting Validator from the Injection flaws vulnerability. The described patient
journal system is likely to have more possible vulnerabilities; to limit scope these will
not be explored. The next step of the development process is to incorporate the two
security improvement activities in the system design.
10.2.2 Design with Countermeasures
The software system has been analysed through vulnerability cause graphs and secu-
rity activity graphs in the countermeasure modelling phase. The security expert has
identified countermeasures that should be introduced already in the software design
phase. This work limits its scope of countermeasures to security design patterns, so
the case study will describe the use of two patterns as shown in Figure 10.7 and 10.9.
The activities (patterns) Intercepting Validator and RBAC are highlighted with colour.
A software developer will now use the security activity graphs to guide his selection
of countermeasures. In a real development case the selection could be performed by
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the security expert highlighting a preferred path of the security activity graphs. Only
two activities are highlighted here because of limited scope. The countermeasures are
implemented in software design by the developer through security pattern templates in
the software design tool Enterprise Architect (82). These are the templates developed
in previous work (13). The applied security patterns in the case study are Intercepting
Validator and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
Intercepting Validator
This pattern describes how to scan or validate data which is passed in from the client.
Client requests may contain malicious content, especially in open environments like the
Web where a client can not always be trusted. The pattern is described in (78), the
following representation is restructured to fit the pattern representation adopted in this
work:
Name
Intercepting Validator
Example
Online bookstores are very interactive and requires a lot of input from
clients. This results in requests with parameters possibly containing mali-
cious content. The sources and types of input are diverse, and there is a
need to ensure that all requests are validated properly before it is processed
in the business logic.
Context
Any environment where the system accepts data passed in from a client
who can not be guaranteed safe or trustworthy.
Problem
You need a simple and flexible mechanism to scan and validate data passed
in from the client for malicious code or malformed content. The data could
be form-based, queries or even XML content. Several well-known attack
strategies involve compromising the system by sending requests containing
invalid data or malicious code. Such attacks include injection of malicious
scripts, SQL statements, XML content, and invalid data using a form field
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that the attacker knows will be inserted into the application to cause a
potential failure or denial of service. The embedded SQL commands can go
further, allowing the attacker to wreak havoc in the underlying database.
These types of attacks require the application to intercept and scrub the
data prior to its use.
The solution to this problem must balance the following forces:
• You want to validate a wide variety of data.
• You want a common mechanism for validating various types of data.
• You want to dynamically add validation logic as necessary to keep your
application secure against newly discovered attacks.
• Validation rules must be decoupled from presentation logic.
Solution
Use an Intercepting Validator to cleanse and validate data prior to its use
within the application, using dynamically loadable validation logic. The
intercepting validator controls a chain of validators which validate the input
in turn. The validators should be applied declaratively based on URL,
allowing different requests to be mapped to different validator chains. The
validation logic in each validator determines whether or not the request
should continue or be aborted. Validation must always be performed on the
server-side.
Structure
A class diagram for Intercepting Validator is shown in Figure 10.10. The
Client class represents the client who sends requests to a target within the
system. In Web applications, this is usually a Web browser. All requests are
handled by SecureBaseAction. This class is used by the client to generically
enforce request validation. Invoking this component should be secure, i.e.
no processing of request parameters should be done. A request is relayed
from SecureBaseAction to this class which is responsible for configuring
chains of validators and running the requests through these chains. Valida-
tor is a generic representation of an input validator holding validation logic.
An instance of the Intercepting Validator pattern implements one or more
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validators, one for each type of input that needs special validation logic.
Target represents the client requested resource. This can be any resource
within the system.
Figure 10.10: Intercepting Validator Class Diagram - Pattern structure
Dynamics
A sequence diagram is shown in Figure 10.11. The sequence follows these
steps:
1. Client makes a request to a particular resource specified as the Target.
2. SecureBaseAcition uses the InterceptingValidator to validate the data
for the target service request.
3. InterceptingValidator retrieves the appropriate validators according to
the configuration for the target.
4. InterceptingValidator invokes a series of validators as configured.
5. Each validator validates the request data. If validation fails, the se-
quence aborts and the request never reaches the target.
6. Upon successful validation, the SecureBaseAction invokes the target
resource.
Implementation
Implementations of the pattern will have different instances of the Validator
class depending on the input and its targets. Different validators are used
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Client SecureBaseAction InterceptingValidator Target
3: request
3.1: validate
Validator 2
1: create
Validator 1
2: create
3.2: invoke
3.1.1: validate
3.1.2: validate
Figure 10.11: Intercepting Validator Sequence Diagram - Interaction sequence
to validate different data types and validators may be coupled with differ-
ent components in the system. For example, data that will become part
of an SQL statement should be validated to ensure that embedded SQL
commands cannot be entered.
Example Resolved
All requests are mapped to proper validators, and input validation is han-
dled in a centralized and uniform manner.
Consequences
The following benefits may be expected from applying this pattern:
• Malicious code and injection attacks are identified before the business
logic processes the request.
• Centralizes security validations, giving more maintainable and reusable
code.
• Decouples validations from presentation logic, giving better software
manageability and reduces redundancy.
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• Simplifies addition of new validators. As new data-based attacks are
discovered, new validators can be implemented and installed without
requiring redeployment of the application.
Potential disadvantages from applying this pattern:
• Increased processing overhead.
Role-Based Access Control
This pattern describes how to assign rights in a system with a large number of users,
information types or resources, and access rights, based on roles, job functions or tasks.
The complete pattern description can be found in (71). The following description is
limited to the most essential parts:
Name
Role-Based Access Control
Example
A hospital has many patients, doctors, nurses and other personnel. The
specific individuals also change frequently. Defining individual access rights
has become a time-consuming activity and is error-prone.
Context
Any environment in which we need to control access to computing resources
where there is a large number of users, information types, or a large variety
of resources.
Problem
For convenient administration of authorization rights we need to have ways
to factor out rights. Otherwise, the number of individual rights is just too
large, and granting rights to individual users would require storing many
authorization rules, and it would be hard for administrators to keep track
of the rules. How do we assign rights based on the functions of tasks of
people?
The solution to this problem must balance the following forces:
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• In most organizations people can be classified according to their func-
tions or tasks.
• Common tasks require similar sets of rights.
• We want to help the organization to define precise access rights for its
members according to a need-to-know policy.
Solution
Most organizations have a variety of job functions that require different skills
and responsibilities. For security reasons, users should get rights based on
their job functions or their assigned tasks. This corresponds to the applica-
tion of the need-to-know principle, a fundamental security policy (79). Job
functions can be interpreted as roles that people play in performing their
duties. In particular, Web-based systems have a variety of users: company
employees, customers, partners, search engines and so on.
Structure
A class diagram for Role-Based Access Control is shown in Figure 10.12.
The User and Role classes describe the registered users and the predefined
roles respectively. Users are assigned to roles which are given rights accord-
ing to their functions. The association class Right defines the access types
that a user within a role is authorized to apply to the protection object.
Figure 10.12: Role-Based Access Control Class Diagram - Pattern Structure
Implementation
Roles may correspond to job titles, for example manager or secretary. A
finer approach is to make them correspond to tasks - for example, a professor
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has the roles of thesis advisor, teacher, committee member, researcher, and
so on.
Example Resolved
The hospital now assigns rights to the roles of doctors, nurses and so on.
The number of authorization rules has decreased dramatically as a result.
Known Uses
Some type of role-based access control is implemented in a variety of com-
mercial systems, including Sun’s J2EE, Microsoft Windows 2000 and several
database systems.
Consequences
The following benefits may be expected from applying this pattern:
• The complexity of security is reduced because there are much more
users than roles.
• Organization policies about job functions can be reflected directly in
the definition of roles and the assignment of users to roles.
• It is very simple to accommodate users arriving, leaving or being reas-
signed. All these actions require only manipulation of the associations
between users and roles.
• Groups of users can be used as role members, further reducing the
number of authorization rules and role assignments.
Potential disadvantages from applying this pattern:
• The pattern may add conceptual complexity with the new concepts of
roles and assignments.
A pattern presents a generic solution and has to be adapted through an instantiation
process. This means mapping and integrating design elements from the pattern onto el-
ements of the application design. Figure 10.13 shows the pattern instantiation dialogue
in Enterprise Architect.
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Figure 10.13: Pattern Instantiation in Enterprise Architect - Instantiation dia-
logue
The patterns are instantiated and merged with the existing design modules described
in Section 10.2. Figure 10.14 shows the high-level design from Figure 10.3 with the In-
tercepting Validator pattern. Requests from the client-side were passed directly to the
servlets through a Web container in the original design. These requests contain parame-
ters which impose severe security risks. The parameters may include malicious content
such as program code, and need to be validated before passed to the servlets. Any
request from the client is now intercepted by the FilterChain class, and all parameters
are validated by one or two validators based on the request address. ParamValidator
is a general validator for all request parameters. SQLValidator validates requests that
will be used in components that connect to an SQL database.
Figure 10.15 shows the high-level data layer design from Figure 10.4 with the RBAC
pattern. Users are now members of roles which give access to data. The Journal, Di-
agnose, DoctorComment and NurseComment classes are instances of ProtectionObject
from the pattern structure, which means access to these resources are controlled by the
pattern. The Role class implements the Role and Right classes which define the access
a user within a role is allowed to apply to a protected object. User access rights to
system resources are now defined in a uniform manner, improving the maintainability
of rights and asserting that resources are protected by the given security policy.
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Figure 10.14: High-Level Design with Security Pattern - Intercepting Validator
is instantiated
Figure 10.15: Data Layer Design with Security Pattern - RBAC is instantiated
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The resulting design implements countermeasures by instantiating security patterns
and making small adjustments to existing design elements. The countermeasures were
identified through the countermeasure modelling process.
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Part IV
Evaluation and Conclusion
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Chapter 11
Evaluation and Discussion
This chapter evaluates the results, contributions and the research method. The com-
pletion of each research objective is evaluated and flaws or shortcomings of the research
method are discussed. Other research initiatives are described and related to this thesis.
11.1 Contributions
This section discusses the significance of the contributions and possible flaws or short-
comings in the results. The discussion is broken down to each research objective. The
objectives are restated below for convenience.
RO1 Develop a security modelling tool that enables software se-
curity experts and practitioners to create models of software
security vulnerabilities and countermeasures.
RO2 Develop software design tool artefacts that provide reusable
security expert knowledge in a format that is applicable at
development time. This tool should apply the output of
the tool described in RO1 to guide design of vulnerability
countermeasures in software.
RO3 Document the tools as a proof of concept and evaluate con-
tributions by performing a case study of the tools in objec-
tives 1-2.
131
11. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
11.1.1 Extension of SeaMonster
The extension of SeaMonster takes it one step closer to being a complete security mod-
elling tool that can be utilised by the software development industry. There are still
several possibilities for improvement in SeaMonster when it comes to general usability
and functionality. Examples are model decomposition, better support for highlighting
of diagram elements, diagram interchange between other modelling and software devel-
opment tools. The testing and case study has shown that SeaMonster is a functional
security modelling tool for modelling of attacks, threats, vulnerabilities and finally
countermeasures through security activity graphs. The preliminary study supports
that this is a tangible contribution to secure software development. This completes
Research Objective 1.
11.1.2 Security Pattern Design Templates
The security pattern design templates described in Section 4.1.1 and applied in the case
study were developed and evaluated in (13). To summarise, there are some limitations
to these:
• Only two security patterns are currently implemented as templates.
• The template format is short on descriptions which may decrease their usability.
They should preserve the typical pattern representation to avoid losing informa-
tion.
• The templates support only one software design tool (Enterprise Architect).
The lack of security improvement tools for software development was identified in the
preliminary study. The security pattern design templates are a tangible contribution
to software design tools as a concept, and it is believed that they will contribute to
increased utilisation of security expert knowledge. This is a step towards bridging the
gap; to include software developers in secure development. These templates complete
Research Objective 2.
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11.1.3 Case Study and Related Process
The case study was included to test the contributions and document them as a proof of
concept. The case describes the implementation of two security improvement activities;
two security pattern design templates. This could favourably be increased to create a
more complete and realistic case. The analysis and design of the patient journal software
system could be more thorough to resemble a complete software design cycle. This was
however not possible in the restricted time. The research method is discussed in Section
11.2, this also includes some thoughts on the case study design. The author was able
to test the tools more thoroughly through the case study and as such it was useful for
evaluation purposes. The significance of this contribution lies in the possible increased
security awareness among software developers who apply security improvement tools.
It puts the spotlight on software security and involves the developers by utilising key
security personnel and expert knowledge where it is needed; in the software development
process.
The case study applied the approach and definitions described in Chapter 7. The coun-
termeasure domain model defines software security concepts that are highly relevant to
software developers. This model allows developers to discuss security concepts in an
unambiguous manner, hopefully to increase security awareness. Including countermea-
sure modelling early in the software development lifecycle is a contribution to change
the old ’penetrate and patch’ ad-hoc security process. It is believed that the described
approach with tools can help identify and mitigate possible security vulnerabilities be-
fore they are realised in software products. Although the case study functions as a
proof of concept and test of contributions, it is not sufficient to state the effects and
significance of these contributions. Research Objective 3 is completed but there is a
need for more validation.
11.2 Research Method
This section discusses the chosen research method and the corresponding validity of
the performed research. This is done in order to assess the work quality and better
understand the results.
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The evaluation phase of the thesis consists of a case study followed by a discussion, both
performed by the author. This is a very subjective evaluation approach where there is a
possible bias towards accepting the results and the hypothesis. A possible improvement
would be to perform a case study with experiments using randomly selected software
development practitioners. The experiments could include usability tests and case
studies with the implemented approach and tools. This kind of study was not included
in the research design because it is out of scope for one person with the available time.
The software system in the case study was limited for the same reason. A more thorough
study could include a more complete software development lifecycle to see the effects
of introducing security in design through the described contributions. Performing a
complete design, implementation and security testing of the patient journal system
could be used for research and results validation.
The lack of validation makes it difficult to state the implications of the contributions
in this thesis. The implemented approach and tools are based on trends and needs
within secure software development identified in the preliminary study. The results are
pointed out by mere observations from the author. Improvements to this work could
be done in further work through a thorough validation.
11.3 Other Initiatives
Ju¨rjens (39) presents methods and tools for model-based security engineering with
UML. This method provides tool support for analysis of UML models against security
requirements A verification framework uses security analysis on models of the secu-
rity extension of UML, UMLsec (38). The aim of this work is to contribute towards
usage of UML for secure systems development in practice. Examples show that this
approach is able to find and correct several serious design flaws. This approach re-
quires the use of and tool support for UMLsec as modelling language. The security
modelling approaches in this thesis have no prerequisites or require prior knowledge of
modelling techniques such as UML. An automated verification framework relies on the
underlying analysis routines to provide and apply the security knowledge. The threats
to software are constantly changing, and mitigating security risk requires an evolving
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set of countermeasures. The scheme presented by Ju¨rjens is more static than the ap-
proach in this thesis where the security knowledge lies with the security expert applying
the approach. This approach and tools provide a way to translate the knowledge of
a security expert into a format that is usable during software development. This way
the security knowledge is not subject to being outdated. Using security modelling to
identify security issues does not introduce a complex process or the need of analysis
engines. A verification framework is a more complex technical solution.
Byers and Shahmeri (6) describe an approach to prevent vulnerabilities from being
introduced during software development, which resembles the work of thesis. Their ap-
proach is based on formal modelling of vulnerability causes through VCGs. Developers
can select a set of activities that will prevent the vulnerabilities. The activities are
modelled using SAGs. This approach is independent of software development process
and its strength lies in flexibility and support for evolution. A modelling tool named
GOAT (57) has been developed to support this process. This tool can not be considered
a complete security modelling tool because it is designed to support the process defined
by Byers and Shahmeri (6) and therefore limited to VCGs and SAGs. SeaMonster cov-
ers a wider range of security modelling techniques although the approach in this thesis
only applies VCGs and SAGs. This makes SeaMonster useful to a wider range of users
and software security applications. According to the developers of GOAT, its usability
is not satisfactory (57). It lacks an undo/redo operation and removed graph elements
are not deleted from the underlying database directly which means a database adminis-
tration tool is needed. Testing shows that the user interface is difficult for inexperienced
users and sometimes cumbersome; e.g. creation of a new vulnerability requires a se-
quence of dialogue boxes. GOAT uses a client-server architecture which means it is
more complex than SeaMonster. This architecture does however give possibilities for
sharing of information. Information on vulnerabilities is stored in the database and can
be shared across several GOAT clients. GOAT must be run with a server and a client;
this is a disadvantage to users that want to model locally on a single computer because
it adds complexity to the use cases. SeaMonster runs on a single desktop computer
without any setup or configuration process. The approach in this thesis includes a cen-
tral storing mechanism as described in Section 9.1, this was however not implemented
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due to time restrictions. With further development, SeaMonster should utilise some
security information repository to access and share security modelling data.
There are many approaches to software security, one of the bigger issues today how-
ever is that they are not applied and understood by software developers. This thesis
arranges software security practice to be used by developers through security improve-
ment tools. The intention is that tool support will increase security awareness and
introducing security in software design tools will bridge the gap between developers
and security experts. Software security practices are usually based on experience and
best practices (34; 43; 45). The approach in this thesis relies on best practices to miti-
gate vulnerabilities, but it does not limit the set of best practices that can be applied.
By analysing the causes of vulnerabilities, we can identify and apply any countermea-
sure without being limited to a predefined set of security practices. This approach
does however rely on the best practices and thorough security knowledge is essential to
perform sound vulnerability and countermeasure analysis.
136
Chapter 12
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the thesis by relating the results and contributions to the hy-
pothesis. Possible further work is summarised.
12.1 Conclusion
A method to apply security knowledge during development has been defined. This
method utilises two security improvement tools during software analysis and design; a
security modelling tool and security pattern design templates. The overall goal of this
thesis was to contribute to development of more secure software by improving three
characteristics of current software development:
• Mitigation of vulnerabilities during design. The case study showed how
vulnerabilities could be avoided during design by utilising the defined method
and implemented tools to identify and apply best practice countermeasures. The
contributions of this thesis help to identify countermeasures effectively and enable
developers to apply them.
• Increasing the software security awareness among developers. The im-
plemented security improvement tools increase the availability of security expert
knowledge and therefore we believe they will contribute to increased security
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awareness. This is not measured during the thesis and validation is needed to
quantify the contribution to this characteristic.
• Bridging the software security knowledge gap between security experts
and developers. The approach of tool supported use of a countermeasure model
during development is a way to share security expert knowledge between security
experts and software developers. The security experts have an approach based on
security modelling of vulnerabilities and countermeasures, which produces secu-
rity information in a format that can be utilised by developers; security activity
graphs and security pattern templates. This enables tighter coupling between
software security expertise and software development practice. Hopefully this
will help to bridge the knowledge gap, however validation is needed to quantify
the contribution to this characteristic.
The hypothesis can not be accepted or rejected based on the results of this thesis.
There is a need for validation of results to quantify the effects of the defined modelling
approach and implemented tools. There are however strong indications that favour
acceptance.
12.2 Further Work
There is clearly a need for further work in security improvement tools and methods
for software analysis and design. It is possible to improve and further develop the
contributions of this thesis. Below is a list of ideas for further work:
• Validation of results. Some empirical validation should be performed to be able
to validate results and accept or reject the hypothesis. The possible increase
in security awareness and contribution to development of more secure software
should be quantified.
• Extending functionality of SeaMonster diagrams. Diagram decomposition and
improved connections between diagrams. This is to improve usability and increase
the general modelling capabilities.
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• Automatic composition. SeaMonster could implement algorithms to generate a
SAG from a VCG automatically. This may benefit those who are not trained in
security and will remove redundant modelling work. Generation of other diagram
types could also be explored.
• Model validation. Study model checking and validation to determine if this is an
efficient way of re-using expert security knowledge.
• Design tool artefacts. Study what other possibilities exist for design tool security
artefacts except pattern templates.
• Security knowledge repository. Ideally, the security pattern templates and secu-
rity models should be accessible from the design tool and SeaMonster respectively
through a repository as described in Section 7.1.
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Appendix A
Glossary
Actor
Active entity external to the system. An actor interacts with the system and can be a
human being or other computing system.
Application Programming Interface (API)
Source code interface that defines the services provided by a code library. The API
defines a contract between a caller and the callee, i.e. the code interface.
Asset
Information or resources which have value to an organization or person. An asset is to
be protected by the system.
Attack Tree (AT)
An attack tree is a way of modelling attacks to a computer system. The tree describes
the different ways in which the goal attack (the root node) can be achieved.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE)
The CVE is a dictionary of publicly known information about security vulnerabilities
and exposures.
Countermeasure
Action taken in order to protect an asset against threats. In a software system, this
refers to features that are implemented to prevent attacks, not to fulfill a functional
requirement.
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Countermeasure model
A formal representation of a countermeasure.
Data-flow Diagram (DFD)
A data-flow diagram is a diagram describing the data flow through an information
system. These diagrams contain data flow between external entities, processes and
data stores.
Eclipse Modeling Framework (EMF)
The EMF project is a modeling framework and code generation facility for building
tools and other applications based on a structured data model.
Graphical Editing Framework (GEF)
Eclipse Graphical Editing Framework is a framework providing rendering and layout
functions to create a graphical editor from an existing application model.
Graphical Modeling Framework (GMF)
The Eclipse Graphical Modeling Framework provides a generative component and run-
time infrastructure for developing graphical editors based on EMF and GEF.
Injection flaw
Common type of security flaw in Web applications. Injection occurs when user-supplied
data is sent to and accepted by an interpreter as part of a command or query.
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP)
The Open Web Application Security Project is a worldwide free and open community
focused on improving the security of application software.
Pattern instantiation
Pattern instantiation refers to the process of implementing a software pattern.
Privilege
The right to perform a certain action in a system.
Risk Management Framework (RMF)
RMF is used in two contexts through the thesis:
1) as some process for handling risk in software development projects.
2) Cigital’s risk management process, the Risk Management Framework (22).
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Security activity
An activity performed during the software lifecycle to fulfill one or more security goals.
Security Activity Graph (SAG)
A security activity graph is a tree structure of activities that can be implemented during
software development to prevent vulnerabilities. An activity is any measure that seeks
to improve the security of the final software product.
Security pattern
A well-understood solution to a recurring security problem.
Security Vulnerability Repository Service (SVRS)
Security Vulnerability Repository Service is part of the technical approach of the EU
project SHIELDS. The SVRS is an internet-accessible knowledge repository to be used
by security tools.
Software Development Lifecycle (SDL)
The software development lifecycle is a general term for a complete software develop-
ment process. A number of different SDL models have been created.
Spoofing, Tampering, Information disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation
of privilege (STRIDE)
STRIDE is a security threat modelling practice where potential security threats are
categorised using six threat categories: spoofing, tampering, information disclosure,
denial of service and elevation of privilege.
Tampering
A category of attacks based on changing information without the right to do so.
Threat
A potential for a security breach of an asset. A threat is a potential attack, it may or
may not be applicable to a given system.
Unified Modeling Language (UML)
The Unified Modeling Language is a family of graphical notations used to describe and
design software systems. The language is particularly suited for systems built using the
object-oriented style.
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Vulnerability
A feature of a system that may be exploited in a way that violates the system security.
Vulnerability Cause Graph (VCG)
A vulnerability cause graph is a security modelling technique used to analyse causes
of software vulnerabilities. The causes of a vulnerability and their relationships are
represented as a directed acyclic graph.
Vulnerability model
A formal representation of a vulnerability.
XML Metadata Interchange (XMI)
XMI is a standard for exhanging metadata via XML. In the context of this thesis it
can be viewed as an interchange format for UML models.
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